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"A WATCHDOG FOR THE GOOD OF THE ORDER":
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S EN BANC COORDINATOR*
Stephen L. Wasby**
I. INTRODUCTION
Little is written about en banc sittings of the United States
Courts of Appeals, and en banc decisions are often excluded
from studies of their judges' voting. What is written tends to be
based on outcomes and votes in en banc cases, with attention to
factors affecting them. But what of the process leading to
granting rehearing en banc? Understanding that process would
be important in learning more about how the courts of appeals
deal with their dockets, about which relatively little is known.
Lawyers may not be much concerned about mechanisms of en
banc rehearing so long as clients' cases proceed expeditiously,
but they might want to know about activity, short of a full en
banc decision, that takes place after a panel opinion when either
* The tagline "A Watchdog for the Good of the Order" originated with Judge J. Blaine
Anderson. See Memo. From J. Blaine Anderson, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to
Alfred T. Goodwin, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir. (July 29, 1987) (available in the
Alfred T. Goodwin Papers at the Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon [hereinafter
"Goodwin Papers"]). The author reviewed the Goodwin Papers while researching this
article; the unpublished documents cited in these notes-including the memorandum from
Judge Anderson to Judge Goodwin referred to earlier in this note and other internal Ninth
Circuit memoranda-are available in the Goodwin Papers. The author has made every
effort to ensure the accuracy of citations to, and quotations from, those documents, but the
editors of The Journal have not had the opportunity to review documents from the
Goodwin Papers cited or referred to in this article. In the interest of brevity, Judge
Anderson, Judge Goodwin, and other judges of the Ninth Circuit, as well as Ninth Circuit
law clerks, secretaries, and staff, are, after once being identified by title, referred to simply
by name in later citations to internal Ninth Circuit memoranda.
** Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, University at Albany-SUNY. B.A., Antioch
College; M.A., Ph.D., University of Oregon. An earlier version of this article was
presented to the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, Illinois, on March 31,
2011. The author wishes to acknowledge the most useful comments by Judge Alfred T.
Goodwin, Mary Schleier, Mark Hurwitz, and Lisa Holmes, and to express his appreciation
to Judge Goodwin for access to his papers.
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a panel rehearing is denied or an amended opinion is released,
the latter a sure indication that some post-panel activity has
taken place.
Our deficit of knowledge about en banc-ing of cases results
in large measure from the fact that after a three-judge panel files
its disposition, decisionmaking takes place in a black box until
announcement that the panel opinion has been amended,
rehearing is denied, or the case has been taken en banc. We
know there is activity, although exactly what has taken place is
not visible. Dissents from denial of rehearing en banc may also
cast some light on judges' views, and some courts make public
the judges' votes on whether to rehear en banc, but the resulting
information remains fragmentary.'
Frequent misunderstanding of how en banc hearings
originate shows why we need to know more. While it is often
assumed that parties' petitions for rehearing en banc (PFREB)
drive the en banc process, 2 and this is reinforced by media
stories of losing parties "considering asking the full court to
rehear the case," relatively few en bancs result from the
petitions. Even when filed, they may not be the trigger for
rehearing because a judge may have already made an en banc
call or said one is forthcoming. Indeed, the initiation of the
process that might lead to a positive vote to go en banc often
originates not from a member of the panel but from another
judge of the court. That judge, having monitored the panel's
ruling, makes a sua sponte en banc call, often because of dislike
for the panel's decision,4 although a dissenter on the panel may
1. But see Arthur D. Heilman, Getting It Right: Panel Error and the En Banc Process
in the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals, 34 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 425 (2000) For a primer on
en banc procedure, see Stephen L. Wasby, The Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals En
Bancs, 33 McGeorge L. Rev. 17, 19-23 (2001).
2. While parties routinely file petitions for rehearing (PFRs), they do not always
accompany them with suggestions for rehearing en banc, perhaps because they are
concerned only with the results in their own cases, not with broader circuit precedent.
3. Hellman, supra n. 1, at 443; Douglas H. Ginsburg and Donald Falk, The Court En
Banc: 1981-1990, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1008, 1013 (1991). There is "no doubt that the
judges of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals engage in a substantial amount of opinion
monitoring." Arthur D. Hellman, The Unkindest Cut: The White Commission Proposal to
Restructure the Ninth Circuit, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 377, 395 (2000).
4. As to why courts of appeals take cases en banc, see Stephen L. Wasby, How Do
Courts of Appeals En Banc Decisions Fare in the U.S. Supreme Court? 85 Judicature 182,
183-84 (Jan.-Feb. 2002).
92
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S EN BANC COORDINATOR
initiate the en bane call, and at times a panel itself does so prior
to disposition upon identifying intra-circuit conflicts. When a
judge initiates the process, the parties may then be asked to
comment on whether the case should be taken banc, thus
reversing the order of events in which party petition precedes
judicial action.
We know that each court of appeals has a chief judge-
who is chief of the entire circuit, not only of the appellate
court6-and non-judicial staff such as the clerk of court or court
executive, and, for the circuit as a whole, the circuit executive.
And they have governing bodies, a meeting of all the judges
wearing their administrative hats or a smaller executive
committee, and some appellate judges participate in the circuit
council of both circuit and district judges. Yet only in the Ninth
Circuit is there another important judicial position, the en banc
coordinator.
In some courts of appeals, panels may circulate to the entire
court all opinions to be published,7 in an informal en banc
process in which other judges can raise questions, with that
circulation and any resulting revisions thouiht to decrease the
likelihood of formal en banc consideration. Yet, even where
such practices exist, and more particularly where they do not,
post-panel activity requires supervision to be kept within
channels. If, after filing of a panel's disposition, the litigants file
only a petition for panel rehearing (PFR) and no other judge
suggests altering the opinion, the matter remains within the
purview of the panel alone. When, however, an off-panel judge,
with either an implicit or explicit threat to call for en banc
consideration, seeks to have the panel amend its ruling, there
5. See Hellman, supra n. 1, at 455 n. 104; see generally Hellman, supra n. 3.
6. See Stephen L. Wasby, The Work of a Circuit's ChiefJudge, 24 Just. Sys. J. 63, 63
(2003).
7. The D.C. Circuit makes particular use of procedures short of an official en banc
sitting-perhaps we should call it a "quasi-en banc procedure"-in this situation. A panel
recognizing that the Supreme Court's action has superseded circuit precedent can circulate
its disposition to the whole court, and if the court agrees, a so-called "Irons footnote" is
added to the pending opinion, indicating the full court's agreement to overturn circuit
precedent. See Ginsburg & Falk, supra n. 3, at 1015 (referring to Irons v. Diamond, 670
F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
8. See generally Hellman, supra n. 1; Ginsburg & Falk, supra n. 3; Michael S. Kanne,
The Non-Banc En Banc: Seventh Circuit Rule 40 (e) and the Law of the Circuit, 32 S. Ill. U.
L.J. 611 (2008).
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may be many communications among the judges, and it might
be useful to have someone superintend the process. Perhaps in a
small court of appeals, this en banc process can function without
difficulty, operating with the invisible hand of implicit
coordination, but, particularly in larger appellate bodies, a
coordinating mechanism would seem to be necessary. For the
Ninth Circuit, the en banc coordinator, directing the process by
which the court considers whether to hear a case en banc, is that
mechanism.
The position of en banc coordinator was created by a chief
judge who believed that other judges should be reminded about
deadlines not by court staff but by a judge, who, after the panel
disposition was filed, would supervise matters leading to the
vote on hearing a case en banc. The Ninth Circuit's Clerk of
Court could monitor the process of deciding to rehear a case en
banc, and more recently someone in that office has done so, but
the Circuit has given to a judge the direction of the process up to
and including the vote on whether to (re)hear the case en banc,
including judges' "stop-clock" requests,9 the exchange of
memos supporting and opposing an en banc call, and the
balloting on whether to proceed en banc.
We do not know very much about how the en banc
coordinator's position might operate across many courts because
it exists in only the Ninth Circuit. There one judge, Alfred T.
Goodwin, served as en banc coordinator from the creation of the
position in the early 1970s until the early 1990s, through his
two-and-one-half year tenure as chief judge and until 1993,
roughly two years after taking senior status.'0 His tenure thus
extended from a smaller court with more informal procedures to
a much larger one that perforce operated with greater formality.
The length of his time in the position allows us to learn about
the coordinator's position by examining Judge Goodwin's
actions.
9. A "stop clock" is a suspending of the time by which en banc rehearing must
ordinarily be sought, used while a judge is seeking to persuade the panel to alter its result
or amend its opinion.
10. Judge Goodwin joined the Ninth Circuit in 1972. He had served as a state trial
judge, almost ten years as a member of a state supreme court, and two years as a federal
district judge, during which time he sat with some frequency by designation with the Ninth
Circuit. See generally Stephen L. Washy, Alfred T Goodwin: A Special Judicial Career,
15 W. Leg. History 9 (2002).
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This article focuses on Judge Goodwin's service as en banc
coordinator. It is based on his papers and on the author's
interviews with him. The judge's papers include case files
containing communications among judges on any activity
related to possible en banc rehearing, that is, for the period after
the filing of the panel's initial decision," judges' calls to go en
banc, and the votes on whether to do so, but also, short of that,
messages when any off-panel judge asked the panel to
reconsider its result and wording.1 2 The article begins with
treatment of the en banc coordinator's position itself, with its
origins and development. Drawing on actual cases, it continues
with what the en banc coordinator has in fact done, including his
role in developing the court's formal en banc policy. The article
ends with brief attention to operation of the en banc coordinating
function since Judge Goodwin stepped down from the position.
II. THE EN BANC COORDINATOR
A. Origins and Continuation in Position
The position of en banc coordinator did not exist in the
Ninth Circuit before the early 1970s. The court once had fewer
than a dozen active judges and then only thirteen until 1978.
Although memos were exchanged by mail, 13 the judges were
able to discuss and vote on taking cases en banc at meetings of
the Court and Council.14 Moreover, there was little en banc
traffic, in part because long-time Chief Judge Richard Chambers
discouraged en bancs. He is said to have believed in the Second
Circuit's view-that if a case was important enough for en banc
rehearing, it was important enough for the Supreme Court to
11. The court used internal e-mail starting in the mid-1980s, but those transmissions are
reduced to hard copy for the working file in a case. See generally Stephen L. Wasby,
Technology and Communication in a Federal Court: The Ninth Circuit, 28 Santa Clara L.
Rev. 1 (1988).
12. See generally Goodwin Papers, supra n.*
13. Stephen L. Wasby, Communication within the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals: The
View from the Bench, 8 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1977); see also Wasby, supra n.
11.
14. The Council then was the court of appeals judges only; with the adoption of the
new federal judicial discipline statute in 1980, circuit councils included district judges as
well.
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hear it, so the court of appeals should let the case go there
without further delay.15 No more than four en banc cases were
decided each year between 1970 and 1980 except for 1974-76,
with a record eighteen handed down in 1974, including half a
dozen en banc rulings on border searches. During this period,
calls to rehear cases en banc often resulted from other judges'
unhappiness at decisions by the two most liberal judges, Walter
Ely and Shirley Hufstedler, or from Judge Hufstedler as to
rulings by the court's more conservative majority.
Even with relatively few en banc requests, "[e]ach time a
call came, there was much paperwork."1 6 This led Chief Judge
Chambers, who, because he "had chief judge stuff to do" and
"didn't have enough secretarial help" to manage en banc
paperwork, to ask Judge Goodwin "to take care of shuffling
cases-to make sure they didn't get delayed."' 7 There were
additional reasons why Chief Judge Chambers created the
position:
(1) He believed that Article III judges, not staff, should
remind other judges of deadlines. ("Judges talk to
judges.").
(2) He thought Judge Goodwin might be the court's chief
judge one day (as he was, from 1988-1991), and that
undertaking the duties of coordinator "would be a training
ground."
(3) He further believed that Judge Goodwin "had
diplomatic skills and attention to detail." 18
(Judge Goodwin has said, "What I had was Helen Murdock,"
referring to his long-time secretary, who was good on attention
to detail and would keep track of matters.19) in short, "Chief
Judge Chambers was outsourcing to someone he could work
with." 20
The en banc coordinator position remained separate from
the chief judgeship throughout Chief Judge James Browning's
15. Interview with Alfred T. Goodwin, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir. (June 22,
2009).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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long tenure (1976-88). Judge Goodwin did try to relinquish the
position shortly before he became chief judge. During court
discussion of not burdening one judge with the coordination
task, he asked for volunteers to assume the position, but there
were none, and his colleagues said, "Let him continue to do it,"
so he retained the position while chief judge.21 And even after he
stepped down and took senior status, his successor, Judge J.
Clifford Wallace, asked him to be coordinator until Wallace was
"comfortable in the chief judgeship."22 It took until late 1993
before a new coordinator was selected-Judge Mary Schroeder,
herself to become chief judge after Judge Proctor Hug, Jr.
Judge Goodwin's role as en banc coordinator was perhaps
"largest" under Chief Judge Chambers, who was not a hands-on
administrator and allowed Goodwin pretty much a free hand to
develop the position.23 Indeed, during Chambers' tenure, Judge
Goodwin not only kept the tally of judges' votes on whether to
hear a case en banc but also helped supervise the process within
the en banc court, including keeping the tally on votes on the
proposed majority opinion. He even sought colleagues' views of
two competing panel opinions to see which judge might be
assigned the en banc case. This, along with other aspects of the
considerable early 1970s border-search case activity, for all
purposes made the en banc coordinator the chief judge of the en
banc court, as Chief Judge Chambers's hand was seldom to be
seen in en banc matters.
Chief Judge Browning, in contrast, assumed supervision of
cases to which en banc rehearing had been granted. This served
to focus Judge Goodwin's work as en banc coordinator almost
exclusively into the period when en banc hearing was being
considered, including the vote on taking a case en banc,
although there were some cases when Browning, as chief judge,
made suggestions to the en banc coordinator, as when he asked
to have included "as an option on the en banc ballot" holding a
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. This is not to say that Chief Judge Chambers played no part in the process leading
to en banc hearing. For example, he suggested to two judges that they place on the agenda
of the court's Council a case to be considered for en banc treatment. Memo. from Richard
Chambers, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to several judges, Re: Wiren v. Eide (Oct.
16, 1975) (addressing Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1976)).
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case for a Supreme Court ruling.24 Judge Browning's chief judge
role could hardly be said to diminish Judge Goodwin's position,
as his involvement in cases taken en banc had not been part of
what Judge Chambers had originally sought to give the
coordinator. Put differently, starting with Chief Judge Browning,
the exercise of the position was as it was thought it should be,
which left plenty of work to be done. And there were some
instances in which Judge Goodwin continued to operate as
coordinator within the en banc. He was, for example, in charge
of gathering votes and arranging opinions in United States v.
Loud Hawk during 1977-78. There were also cases in which
Judge Goodwin handled all activity, including within the en
banc court, even though Chief Judge Browning was
participating, and other cases in which he, not the en banc
opinion's author, collected votes on rehearing of an en banc
ruling.27
In 1980, with the Ninth Circuit's adoption of a limited en
banc (LEB) panel com osed of the chief judge and ten other
judges drawn by lot,2 Judge Goodwin still supervised the
decision whether to go en banc but was not involved in en banc
cases for which he was not drawn. This reinforced somewhat the
separation of the en banc coordinator's work in the pre-en banc
period and the chief judge's work supervising communication
within the en banc courts. When he was chief judge, Judge
Goodwin, because he sat in all en banc cases, carried out both
the en banc coordinator's functions and those of the court's chief
judge.
The growth in the court's size, which led to its adoption of
the LEB, changed the context in which the en banc coordinator
worked. Over time, the en banc process in general, and
monitoring time limits in particular, became more formalized.
For example, where earlier, judges would indicate their votes on
24. Memo. from James Browning, C.J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to
Associates, Re: Saenz v. I.N.S. (Sept. 9, 1986) (addressing Saenz v. IN.S., 792 F.2d 144
(9th Cir. 1986) (tbl.), opinion withdrawn, 814 F.2d 1493 (9th Cir. 1987)).
25. 628 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
26. See e.g. id.
27. See e.g. U.S. v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1979); Harris v. Super. Ct., 500 F.2d
1124 (9th Cir. 1974), overruled, Luce v. U.S., 469 U.S. 38 (1984).
28. In 2005, there was an expansion to fifteen judges for two years before reversion to
eleven judges.
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en banc in memos arguing for or against rehearing, they then
began to use ballot forms. And procedures became "a little more
complicated," as a result of "[tihe increase in judges [to twenty-
three and then twenty-eight], the increase in number of stop
clocks and calls for en banc votes, plus .. . new rules."29
Judges who filled positions created by the Judgeship Bill of
197830 more frequently called for en banc rehearing. Indeed, the
new judges were barely on the court before they spoke out
against an en banc decision made by the "old" court' in a case
involving the emotional issue of a search in which police had
bribed a small child to reveal drugs, leading to his mother's
conviction. 32 A judge who had just joined the court asked for an
opportunity to comment, while another even sought a rehearing
of the ruling, although the request was defeated. Judge Goodwin
proposed that the matter be discussed at the next court meeting,
but almost immediately a number of judges, including Chief
Judge Browning, responded individually by indicating that it
would be inappropriate as well as at odds with the court's new
rules for the limited en banc court. The action by these judges
saved the en banc coordinator the onus of resolving the problem,
but at its meeting, the court agreed to allow any judge to call for
rehearing the court's en banc decision. Such a call was made but
did not receive a majority.
B. En Banc Coordinator and Judge
Through Judge Goodwin's entire service as en banc
coordinator, he remained a full-time court of appeals judge,
who, like anyone else, had assignments to three-judge panels
and participated in the court's en banc cases as only one judge
among many. He received no calendar relief-no equivalent of
an academic's "course reduction"-for his administrative work,
29. Memo. from Adell Johnson, Secretary, to Alfred T. Goodwin (July 17, 1987).
30. Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 3, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978) (providing in section 3(a) that "[t]he
President shall appoint . . . ten additional circuit judgeships for the ninth circuit" and
further providing in section 3(c) that "the table contained in [28 U.S.C. 44] will ... reflect
the changes in the number of judgeships made by this Act," and amending that table to
show this change in the number of judges on the Ninth Circuit).
31. The en banc court for this case initially contained eleven judges, but only nine
judges remained after two took senior status during its consideration.
32. U.S. v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980).
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nor did he seek it: "Our case load was much smaller than that of
today's active judges, and it never occurred to me to ask for a
reduction in calendars." 33 Like all the other judges, with his law
clerks' aid he monitored other judges' rulings to see if they were
en banc-worthy. At times his clerks advised whether he should
call for an en banc rehearing, something he seldom did, and they
would comment on off-panel judges' memos stopping the clock
or supporting an en banc call. They would also make
suggestions on how he should vote on such calls.
When Judge Goodwin served on a panel that became
involved in activity directed toward en banc hearing, it was
particularly obvious that he had dual roles-as a judge with a
vote, and as en banc coordinator. In one case, he wrote a
message to his panel colleagues " a]s en banc coordinator as
well as a member of the . .. panel." 4 In a case where there was
a question whether a panel should seek en banc hearing before
filing its disposition, he suggested modifying the panel's
published opinion rather than creating an en banc situation, but
the panel did make a sua sponte en banc call.35
Judge Goodwin attempted to keep his judge and
coordinator roles separate. In one instance, in a case in which he
had written an en banc dissent, rehearing of the ruling was
sought, so he asked Chief Judge Browning to serve in his stead
in calling for the vote.36 And in most matters, the coordinator
role and his role as a member of the court did not bleed into
other. As en banc coordinator's role, he was almost invariably a
neutral transmitter of requests or information, including rules
interpretations. That he did not often stop the clock in cases or
call for en banc served to minimize the blurring or conflict of
roles. And he was well aware that he held two related roles. In
33. Email from Alfred T. Goodwin to author (Mar. 1, 2010, 6:03 p.m. EST).
34. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Panel, Re: Pettibone v. Cupp, (June 4, 1982)
(addressing Pettibone v. Cupp, 666 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1982)).
35. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Panel, Re: U.S. v. Zolin (Sept. 15, 1987)
(addressing U.S. v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir.), vacated & set for rehearing en banc,
832 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated, 842 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that rehearing
had been improvidently granted), cert. granted, 488 U.S. 907 (1988), aff'd in part &
vacatedin part, 491 U.S. 554 (1989)).
36. Memo. from James R. Browning to Associates, Re: Penn (June 26, 1980).
37. In one of these cases, Judge Goodwin's first four memos to his colleagues were
from him as a regular member of the court; they related to his stopping the clock. Only late
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one case with many memos exchanged, on some days he sent
two memos, one in each capacity, and as en banc coordinator, he
was careful to refer to "Judge Goodwin" in describing his
actions as a member of the court, but, more than that, he
specifically noted that he held both roles.38 When he continued
to serve as en banc coordinator once he was chief judge, he
handled all matters in the en banc court itself, as the chief judge
would normally do, and his communications to his colleagues
were from "Chief Judge Goodwin." 39
At times, however, the roles as judge and en banc
coordinator did blur, as when, after the Supreme Court's remand
of the Bowen border search case,40 Judge Goodwin circulated his
proposed panel opinion to the full court, leading to scattered
votes for hearing en banc before the panel itself called for an en
banc vote, and this opinion served as the memorandum
supporting the call.4' In another case also indicating the melding
of roles, he called for an en banc vote without panel action and
then set the time for the exchange of memos;42 he also
recommended against recalling the mandate in another case,
action that would have allowed an en banc vote, and said he
could live with the present opinion until a better case came
along.43 In another case he took a position on the issue at the
heart of an en banc call: whether the panel or an en banc court
should proceed when the Supreme Court had undermined past
cases. 44 In yet another case, he said an off-panel judge's
in the process that led to an amended opinion did he send a memo as en banc coordinator,
saying that the panel could deny rehearing if there was no en banc call by a certain date.
See U.S. v. Castiglione, 876 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1988).
38. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin, to Associates, Re: U.S. v. Giese (Jan. 12, 1979)
(addressing U.S. v. Giese, 569 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1978), superseded, 597 F.2d 1170 (9th
Cir. 1979) (noting that the original opinion had been withdrawn to allow for a vote on
hearing the case en banc)).
39. In one case during this period, another judge referred to Judge Goodwin as "our
beleaguered en banc coordinator" without mentioning his chief judge status. Memo. from J.
Blaine Anderson to Associates, Re: Cook (May 16, 1979).
40. U.S. v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (on remand).
41. See Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Bowen (Sept. 10, 1973).
42. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Active Judges, Re: In re Gustafson (Feb. 1,
1980) (addressing In re Gustafson, 619 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1980)).
43. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: U.S. v. Robinson (Nov. 15,
1976) (addressing U.S. v. Robinson, 536 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1976)).
44. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Le Vick v. Skaggs Cos., Inc.,
(May 24, 1983) (addressing Le Vick v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 701 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1988)).
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memorandum "has caused me to reexamine our opinion" and to
respond with a suggestion that the panel substitute some
language.45
There were also times when he inserted his own views into
communications and took a position relating to en banc process,
as when he suggested that the court should "not try to vote on
something as important as the adoption of a uniform standard [of
'mismanagement by defense counsel'] by the circuit without
hearing argument or at least having a collegial discussion around
the conference table."46 At times he even put his thumb on the
scales about taking a case en banc, as when he suggested that a
panel reconsider its disposition in view of the Supreme Court's
decision in a related case, to preclude the need for en banc
activity.47 In a more obvious instance, when a panel, upon
issuing its opinion, sought en banc hearing, Judge Goodwin,
while acknowledging that such a request "ordinarily ... is more
or less cheerfully ratified by a majority of the judges," stated
that he was "in doubt about the purpose of the proceeding,"
which he found "unclear from the memo" so "the panel should
provide further enlightenment why they wish to have this case
reheard en banc" and should supply a list of "a specific group of
cases it would like to see overruled." With that list in hand, he
"continue[d] to question whether this case is the appropriate
vehicle for getting us back on one track.",4 And in another
instance where he did not remain fully above the fray and
clearly exercised something more than a mere coordinating
function, he indicated his preference as to which of two cases
should be taken en banc. Injecting his choice was even more
clear when, in the substantial en banc activity concerning border
searches, he set out several options for disposition of a case and,
showing the agenda-setting in which he could engage, selected
45. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Panel, Stephen Reinhardt, Re: U.S. v. Neal,
(Oct. 29, 1992) (addressing U.S. v. Neal, 976 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1992)).
46. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Panel, Re: Cooper v. Fitzharris (July 12, 1977)
(addressing Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir.), 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978)
(en banc) (affirming panel)).
47. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Saenz (Mar. 11, 1987).
48. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Panel, Re: Bates v. Sullivan (Jan. 26, 1990)
(addressing Bates v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1990)); Memo. from Alfred T.
Goodwin to Panel, Re: Bates (Feb. 6, 1990) (reminding recipients that Arthur Hellman, a
law professor who follows the Ninth Circuit's en banc activity, "is watching").
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one option "for the pragmatic reason that this is the one the
author would vote for." He did, however, recognize that his
suggestion "will not meet with unanimous approval," and he
said further that he was "merely trying to place something
before the court upon which we can express our individual
views.
He could also be seen inserting his views when, in the
border search cases, he argued that the question of retroactivity
should be separated "from the other compound questions
involved in the 'functional equivalent' cases,"50 although he
may have offered this comment only to facilitate the court's
work. It is also possible that he was stating his own views when
he noted "two complications" to a clean resolution of the
retroactivity question in the same set of cases.5 1 His comments
clearly went to the substance of a case when the panel author
was considering revision of an opinion on an Indian tribe's
assertion of criminal jurisdiction over an individual when neither
that individual nor the crime victim were members of the tribe.
There he suggested, "I believe it is important to look at the local
(tribal, etc.) ordinance in each case," because, while he did not
"know whether Indian tribal ordinances are federal legislation or
not, ... [t]hey present federal questions," and he talked of the
theory under which he and his Oregon district court colleagues
had operated and provided examples with respect to native
Americans in Oregon.52
49. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: U.S. v. Grijalva-Carrera (May
16, 1974) (addressing US. v. Graalva-Carrera, 500 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc)
(per curiam)).
50. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to All Active Judges, Others, Re: Grijalva-Carrera
(Dec. 14, 1973).
51. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Grijalva-Carrera, (Mar. 28,
1974) (available in Goodwin Papers as part of Bowen materials). In a later case, he drew on
that earlier experience in writing to his colleagues: "Members of the court will recall that a
good deal of paperwork was occasioned by the failure of our court to deal with the
retroactivity problems in the slipstream of Almeida-Sanchez," he wrote, and then expressed
the hope "that we can avoid some of this by focusing on these problems on a pre-need
basis." Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Cooper (Sept. 9, 1977).
52. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Melvin T. Brunetti, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the
Ninth Cir., Re: Duro v. Reina (Apr. 7, 1988) (addressing Duro v. Reina, 821 F.2d 1358
(9th Cir.), vacated, 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd., 495 U.S. 656 (1990), and
including a "cc: Associates").
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1. Assistance
Judge Goodwin had assistance in carrying out his
coordinator's tasks. The General Orders permitted another judge
to perform the coordinator's duties during the latter's absence,
and in such a situation, Chief Judge Browning granted an
extension of time for a memorandum. 53 But Judge Goodwin's
staff handled much of the day-to-day work. He relied on his
chief secretaries, 54 who kept records as to relevant dates and
would "ticker" cases to as reminders to take action or to ask the
judge what they or he should do, but their role was far greater
than that of time-keeper. They would initiate inquiries to the
judge, as when one asked if en banc voting should be deferred
until a related en banc case was decided, and, if so, whether
counsel should be told. 5 They might enlist other judges'
secretaries, asking them to remind their judges of certain acts.
They might also respond directly to other chambers' inquiries,
for example, when another judge (or the judge's secretary), not
having heard about a case, would ask for its status,56 or, on a
more important matter, they might tell another judge's clerk
when a stop-clock would be timely.5 7 The secretaries would
draft memoranda for the judge's signature, and he would edit
these only lightly, even on matters such as whether a panel
seeking en banc hearing should ask for briefs from the parties
about conflict with another case or if the response time for
53. See Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to All Active Judges, Re: Scott v. Machinists
Automotive Trades Dist. Lodge No. 190 (Nov. 30, 1987) (addressing Scott v. Machinists
Automotive Trades Dist. Lodge No. 190, 815 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir.), aff'd in part, vacated in
part & remanded, 827 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1987)).
54. For a discussion of the function and responsibilities of an appellate judge's
secretaries, see Stephen L. Wasby, A Judicial Secretary's Many Roles: Working with an
Appellate Judge and Clerks, 7 J. App. Prac. & Process 151 (2005).
55. Memo. from Adell Johnson to Alfred T. Goodwin, Re: Jeffers v. Ricketts (undated)
(handwritten) (addressing Jeffers v. Ricketts, 832 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1987), reversed, 497
U.S. 764 (1990)); Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Panel, Re: Jeffers (Mar. 1988).
56. Memo. from Adell Johnson to Harry Pregerson, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth
Cir., Re: Scott (July 13, 1987).
57. See Memo. from Jeff [no last name indicated], Law Clerk, to Alfred T. Goodwin,
Re: Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct. (May 16, 1988) (addressing Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct., 838 F.2d
1031 (9th Cir.), 861 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1988) (denying petition for rehearing and rejecting
suggestion for rehearing en banc)).
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memos among the judges should be started. At times they
provided the judge with options. When, after a judge had
accommodated a panel author by withdrawing a stop clock and
the panel's delay in revising its opinion bordered on a "pocket
veto,"59 the secretary wrote alternate messages to be sent and
asked if Judge Goodwin should let the judge get away with it or
should simply start responsive time for memoranda and notify
the judge.6
The secretaries would also prod the judge to take necessary
action, on matters both simple, such as saying it was time for a
judge to make a call for an en banc vote, and more complex, as
when a secretary's comment about a possible "pocket-veto" 61
led Judge Goodwin to call the tardy judge, and when the
secretary suggested a memo reminding the offending judge of
62the new General Orders. With nothing forthcoming, she then
said he had to act even if it made him a "common scold," and he
restarted the time for exchange of memos as if the panel had not
sought to revise its opinion. 6 The secretaries might even act
directly themselves, for example, extending time for
memoranda, or tellinF the Clerk to hold up filing a denied
petition for rehearing. When a stop clock was filed at the last
58. See e.g. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Landreth v. Commr.,
(Oct. 13, 1987) (addressing Landreth v. Commr., 859 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1988)); Memo.
from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Landreth (Sept. 22, 1987).
59. A "pocket veto" occurred when a judge said a panel opinion would be revised but
then consumed an extended time without producing the revision.
60. Memo. from Adell Johnson to Alfred T. Goodwin, Reminder Memo Re: Walker v.
Endell (May 5, 1988) (addressing Walker v. Endell, 828 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.), superseded,
850 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1987); Memo. from Adell Johnson to Alfred T. Goodwin, Re:
Walker v. Endell (Dec. 30, 1987).
61. Memo. from Adell Johnson to Alfred T. Goodwin, Tickler Memo Re: Duro (May 5,
1988).
62. See Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Betty Binns Fletcher, J., U.S. Ct. of App.
for the Ninth Cir., Re: U.S. v. Whitney (Dec. 11, 1987) (addressing U.S. v. Whitney, 785
F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1986), amended, 838 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1988)). The secretary's
language to Judge Goodwin about the delaying judge was direct: "[U]nless we send her
something like the [proposed] memo she can delay this indefinitely." See Memo. from
Adell Johnson to Alfred T. Goodwin, Re: Whitney (undated).
63. Memo. from Adell Johnson to Alfred T. Goodwin, Re: Whitney (Dec. 30, 1987);
Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Whitney (Dec. 30, 1987) (incorporating
Johnson's suggestions).
64. Consider, for example, the situation in which Adell Johnson told Judge Norris how
long he could call for en banc rehearing and reported that she had told the Clerk not to file
the PFR in the case, which the panel had denied. See Memo. from Law Clerk [not
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minute-after the panel's presiding judge sent an order denying
rehearing to be filed-Goodwin's chief secretary placed a hold
on that filing, causing the panel judge to ask that the hold be
65released. And secretaries were involved in en banc policy
matters. Adell Johnson regularly suggested recommendations to
be made to the court's Executive Committee and, in an
important instance of staff input, drafted a rewrite of the General
Order provisions on the time for responsive memos. Showing
her continued awareness of the coordinator's role vis a vis his
colleagues, she said that allowing the coordinator "automatically
[to] start the time after a given number of days . .. would reduce
the times the en banc coordinator must play the court's
'common scold' in trying to get the panel to do its work."6 6
Judge Goodwin's law clerks also provided assistance. He
did not use all of them for work on en banc matters, as they had
their regular load of cases for which to prepare bench
memoranda, draft and/or edit opinions, and monitor other
judges' opinions,67 but he might designate one clerk to help with
en banc matters, and when he became chief judge, he
transformed a secretary's position into a fourth clerk position for
this purpose. A staff attorney who spent time in the judge's
chambers as a law clerk exercised some duties related to the
coordinator's position, dealing particularly with deadlines, and,
when Judge Goodwin was absent from chambers, answered
another judge's question about the form of an order. 68 The clerks
would prepare memos for the judge, pose questions as to what
identified by name] to Adell Johnson, Re: U.S. v. Eagon (Feb. 2, 1983) (addressing U.S. v.
Eagon, 707 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1982), and confirming Johnson's communication).
65. Memo. from Stephen J. Reinhardt, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to Alfred
T. Goodwin, Re: Gutierrez (May 25, 1988); Memo. from Eileen Engett, Secretary, to
Alfred T. Goodwin, Re: Gutierrez (May 13, 1988).
66. Memo. from Adell Johnson to Alfred T. Goodwin (July 17, 1987).
67. For an extended discussion of the work of clerks in the courts of appeals that is
based on Judge Goodwin's clerks, see Stephen L. Wasby, Clerking for an Appellate Judge:
A Close Look, 5 Seton Hall Cir. Rev. 19 (2008).
68. See Memo. from William A. Norris to Panel & Alfred T. Goodwin, Re: Hollinger
v. Titan Capital Corp. (Sept. 6, 1989) (addressing Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914
F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (as amended): "In Judge Goodwin's absence, I have
checked with his law clerk Paul Keller and he assured me the proposed order as originally
drafted was consistent with past orders."). Keller later took a senior position in the Clerk's
office, where he became the primary staff person for en banc work under later en banc
coordinators. See pp. 141-42, infra.
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should be done,69 send standard directives and draft orders, and
would even provide advice, as when one suggested how to head
off a spat between two judges. 70 A clerk might be in direct
contact with other judges' clerks about en banc matters. Called
by another judge's clerk about procedure for calling for a full
court en banc, Judge Goodwin's clerk developed an
interpretation of the rules, spelling out uncertainty in them and
71indicating options.
Assistance also came from both court staff-the Clerk's
office and staff attorneys-and judges. When parties moved for
initial en banc hearing, staff attorneys prepared memoranda and
made recommendations as to why such a hearing was not
necessary, so that, in one case, Judge Goodwin could tell the
court's active judges, "I have reviewed the record and agree
with the staff attorney's memo . . . that the request for an initial
hearing en banc should be denied." 72
While much post-panel communication went through the
en banc coordinator, judges at times prodded each other directly
or picked up on matters, saving the coordinator from having to
do so, as when Judge (later Justice) Kennedy acted on another
judge's suggestion to request that staff attorneys prepare a
memorandum on standards for ineffective counsel. And a
judge on a panel calling for en banc, rather than waiting, even
69. See Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Panel, Associates, Re: Shedelbower v.
Estelle & Endell v. Smith (Jan. 24, 1989) (clerk drafted; addressing Shedelbower v. Estelle,
859 F.2d 727 (9th Cir 1988), withdrawn and superseded, 885 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1989), and
Endell v. Smith, 860 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1989)); Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Panel,
Associates, Re: Shedelbower & Endell (Dec. 9, 1988) (same); Memo. from David G.
Little, Law Clerk, to Alfred T. Goodwin, Re: Shedelbower & Endell (Dec. 6, 1988).
70. Memo. from Jeff [no last name indicated] to Alfred T. Goodwin, Re: Gutierrez
(May 16, 1988).
71. Memo. from David G. Little to Alfred T. Goodwin, Re: Gutierrez (Jan. 17, 1989).
In this matter, Judge Goodwin, by then Chief Judge, took the problem to the Executive
Committee, which agreed that the call was untimely, at which point Judge Goodwin
indicated that the judge could seek to suspend the rules.
72. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Active Judges, Re: Draper v. Coombs (Aug.
10, 1982) (addressing Draper v. Coombs, 703 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1983) (tbl.)). When no
judge made an en banc call, Judge Goodwin so informed the motions attorney. Memo.
from Alfred T. Goodwin to Joseph Schlesinger, Motions Atty., U.S. Ct. of App. for the
Ninth Cir., Re: Draper (Sept. 13, 1982) (replying to Mr. Schlesinger's memo of August 3,
1982).
73. Memo. from Anthony M. Kennedy, J. U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to
Associates, Re: Cooper (July 27, 1977).
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asked that votes be sent to Judge Goodwin, who sent his own
follow-up memo. 74 A judge pointing up a rule violation said that
because another judge had taken a week longer than allowed for
a stop-clock memo, he was going to file the order denying
rehearing, but then he gave the offending judge two weeks
more.7 5 Likewise, without waiting for Judge Goodwin, other
judges might make suggestions about the process: During
consideration of whether to take a case en banc, they might, for
example, identify problems in the process that they thought
should be addressed and suggest that the rules be revised. In the
normal course of events, court colleagues would call attention to
missed deadlines, although they might have done so less out of
altruistic concern than to protect opinions they had written.
The en banc coordinator's colleagues played a more formal
role as to en banc rules when the court as a whole considered
amending them and, more particularly, by serving on
committees to consider major revisions. In 1987, an En Banc
Committee of Judges Stephen Reinhardt, Joseph Sneed, and
Goodwin proposed amendments to the rules, in the course of
which they sought guidance and feedback, particularly from the
court's Executive Committee and from other judges as well, and
they did receive commentary from some.76 And at the very end
of his tenure as en banc coordinator, Judge Goodwin served on
another such committee, chaired by Judge Ferdinand F.
Fernandez, which made recommendations to the court's
Executive Committee, particularly concerning altering some
deadlines. It is of interest that these recommendations, in which
Judge Goodwin appears to have concurred, included abolishing
the coordinator's authority to extend time limits, but the court
did not act on it.
74. Memo. from Shirley M. Hufstedler, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to
Associates, Senior Judges, Re: Riser v. Craven (May 10, 1974) (addressing Riser v.
Craven, 501 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1974)); Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to All Active
Judges, Re: Riser (May 13, 1974).
75. Memo. from J. Clifford Wallace, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to
Associates, Re: Hoptowit v. Ray (May 4, 1982) (addressing Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d
1237 (9th Cir. 1982)).
76. For example, Judge Thomas Tang, as chair of the court's State Habeas Committee,
communicated to the Executive Committee on proposals made by Judge Goodwin. See
Memo. from Thomas Tang, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to Court Exec. Comm.
(Apr. 6, 1988).
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III. THE COORDINATOR'S WORK
What does the en banc coordinator do? He coordinates,
establishes, and administers deadlines; exercises discretion;
identifies problems; establishes policy through decisions; and
aids in development of rules. The en banc coordinator's primary
function has been to set deadlines for the circulation of memos
in support of--or in opposition to--an en banc call or a vote on
whether to take a case en banc, and to ensure that judges carry
out tasks such as filing orders asking for a response to an en
banc rehearing petition.
The coordinator's position has been defined in the court's
General Orders as "an active or senior judge appointed by the
Chief Judge to perform the duties set forth in this chapter." 77
Those orders include this rather brief formal statement of duties:
The en banc coordinator shall supervise the en banc
process, including time schedules provided in this chapter;
shall circulate periodic reports on the status of each case
under en banc consideration; may, for good cause, extend,
suspend, or compress the time schedules provided in this
Chapter; may designate another judge to perform all or part
of the en banc coordinator's duties during the coordinator's
absence; may suggest, for any particular case, the
modification or suspension of the provisions of this
chapter; and may for good cause suspend en banc
78proceedings.
Here we see supervisory and reporting functions and the
discretion to manage the en banc process.
The General Orders contain some other, more specific
items, such as one directing the Clerk to file an order rejecting a
petition for en banc, 79 and certain procedures to be followed.
Thus when a party seeks en banc hearing before a case is heard
by a panel, or there is a panel's sua sponte en banc call before
disposition, the en banc coordinator, in addition to notifying all
77. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, General Orders (updated
Dec. 13, 2010) at 5.1(a)(5) (available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/uploads/
rules/general orders/generalorders.pdf) [hereinafter "G.O."] (accessed Apr. 20, 2010;
copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). The word "senior" was added
to allow Judge Goodwin to continue after he took senior status.
78. Id. at 5.1(b)(2).
79. Id at 5.2(a).
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active judges of the "suggestion," is given the authority to
"distribute an independent evaluation of the matter."80 The rules
also specify the number of days for the exchange of memoranda
and the time within which voting on en banc calls shall take
place.81
The basic matters to which the en banc coordinator must
attend are the following:
* When a judge "stops the clock" to seek revision of
the panel opinion or calls for en banc rehearing, see
to it that the supporting memo is circulated by the
appropriate date.
* Upon a stop-clock, set an appropriate date for the
panel's response.
* When a response to a rehearing petition is
requested, ask the panel's author to see that a
response is requested from the parties.
* When that response is received, set dates for the
exchange of memoranda.
* Upon an en banc call, indicate the date by which
memos are to be circulated.
* In situations where, upon a stop clock or en banc
call, the panel revises an opinion, ask whether the
calling judge renews en banc call.
* Send a ballot and set the date for the end of voting.
* Indicate whether en banc vote fails, with panel to
resume control, or succeeds, with the chief judge to
enter an order withdrawing the case from panel.
80. Id. at 5.2(a).
81. Id. at 5.5(a), 5.5(b).
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Petitions for rehearing (PFRs) are handled within the
panel, but a panel deciding an accompanying petition for
rehearing en banc (PFREB) is to inform the full court, in a
notice that an off-panel judge might have requested, if it is about
to deny the petition. Such a notice or an earlier stop-clock would
trigger the en banc coordinator's duty to see if any judge made a
timely en banc call. Even without a PFREB, a judge's sua
sponte en banc call would likewise trigger the monitoring
function, as would inquiries from a motions attorney about a
litigant's request for en banc hearing prior to panel ruling.82
For many cases, the coordinator's post-panel
communications to "Associates" are few and solely routine,
doing no more than applying the General Orders. Requests that
the coordinator vary deadlines, usually to extend time to send
memos, are generally also routine, but whether a judge should
be held to a missed deadline could become contentious, with the
coordinator having to try to resolve the situation. And
difficulties could arise if a judge tried to test the limits, as one
judge did in sending a stop-clock memo at 11:58 p.m. on the last
possible day, after the Clerk's office had released the mandate
during business hours on the same day. The judge then took the
position that the Clerk's action was premature and asked the
panel to recall the mandate or, if no recall was to be
forthcoming, asked for a ruling "from the en banc czar."
Because the panel granted the request to recall the mandate,
Judge Goodwin did not have to issue a ruling.
A judge once also tested limits by asking for several time
extensions-first so the panel could ask parties for a response,
then pressing the coordinator for a quick reply, then asking for
more time on the last day for memoranda as well as a week later,
82. When a party makes a request to a motion panel that a case be heard en banc, in
the normal course, the matter of deciding whether this initial en banc call is warranted is
left for decision to the merits panel before which the case is then placed. See Memo. from
Beth Levine, Motions Atty., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to Alfred T. Goodwin, Re:
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist. Lodge No. 751 v. Boeing Co. (Apr. 28, 1982)
addressing Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist. Lodge No. 751 v. Boeing, 694 F.2d 723
(9th Cir. 1982) (tbl.)).
83. See Memo. from Alex Kozinski to J. Clifford Wallace & All Judges, Re: Outdoor
Systems, Inc. v. City of Mesa & Whiteco Metrocom, Inc. v. City of Tucson, (July 22,
1993) (addressing Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1993)
(opinion after reargument), and Whiteco Metrocom, Inc. v. City of Tucson, 997 F.2d 604
(9th Cir. 1993) (same)).
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after which he made comments four days later, apparently
during voting.84 One judge responding claimed no criticism of
this judge for the lateness of his memorandum but said that the
time available led him to a briefer response than he would have
preferred in light of the serious questions posed in it, and
another judge, while commenting on the problem of comments
during the voting period, then made some himself.85 Situations
like these test not only limits of the rules but also the court's
norms of collegiality and the en banc coordinator's patience.
Once the en banc process was set in motion, the task of
reminding colleagues of certain necessary actions might become
less routine and more variable, but, on the whole, nothing would
be out of the ordinary. Moreover, the number of
communications in some cases is minimal: An en banc call is
made; a response by the parties to the PFREB is ordered; upon
receipt of the response, the caller and the panel send memos; and
a vote is taken. In such situations, the en banc coordinator is
rarely involved beyond sending routine notices and reminders.
One can find many such simple cases, with minimal activity by
the coordinator, as when the panel dissenter calls for en banc
rehearing, there are no responses, and there is a vote, which
fails. 86 In these mine-run situations, the en banc coordinator is
simply there, "above the fray." Even with other judges sending
memos back and forth, the coordinator may not be much
involved, as in one case when Judge Goodwin's only memo did
not come until after six memos among other judges, a further
indication that the post-panel process may at times have
84. These communications were made in the following series of memos: Memo. from
Alex Kozinski to Associates, Re: U.S. v. Goland (May 22, 1992) (addressing U.S. v.
Goland, 959 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1992), reh. denied, 977 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1992)
(Pregerson, Tang, Kozinski,& Kleinfeld, JJ., dissenting)); Memo from Alex Kozinski to
Alfred T. Goodwin, Re: Goland (May 26, 1992); Memo. from Alex Kozinski to Alfred T.
Goodwin, Associates, Re: Goland (Aug. 20, 1992); Memo. from Alex Kozinski to Alfred
T. Goodwin, Associates, Re: Goland (Aug. 27, 1992); Memo. from Alex Kozinski to
Associates, Re: Goland (Aug. 31, 1992).
85. See Memo. from William A. Norris to Associates, Re: Goland (Sept. 2, 1992);
Memo. from Andrew J. Kleinfeld, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to Associates, Re:
Goland (Sept. 3 1992).
86. See e.g. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 831 F.2d 889 (9th Cir.), amended and
superseded after reh. denied, 844 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1987); Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d
183 (9th Cir. 1987); Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987).
87. See Perez v. IN.S., 643 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
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functioned virtually without him,88 like "the machine that would
run of itself."89 In another case, without Judge Goodwin doing
more than sending reminder memos, one judge called for en
banc rehearing but then, on the panel's opinion revision,
withdrew the call, and another judge made her own call because
the revisions did not solve the problem to her satisfaction, and
judges, having circulated supporting memos, went directly to a
vote.90 In another case in which two judges serially asked for
changes in the panel's opinion and over a dozen memoranda
were exchanged before the call was withdrawn, none were from
Judge Goodwin. 91 Even when the en banc coordinator sends
several messages, all may be routine, setting dates and moving
things along, with the en banc call and response(s) proceeding
easily through several iterations.92
In contrast, other cases have voluminous communications,
with much substantive argument and procedural complexity:
perhaps a "stop clock"; several exchanges as the panel decides
whether to amend its opinion; a revision not satisfying the
questioning judge, who then makes an en banc call; multiple
exchanges on whether to take the case en banc; extensions of
time for responses; and even procedural difficulties. Yet not
even in all such instances is there considerable coordinator
involvement, as when, in one case, judges sent twenty-seven
88. That there can be frequent response in a short time through e-mail is shown by five
memos about a single case having been exchanged in one day, with no involvement by
Judge Goodwin. See Memo. from Dorothy W. Nelson, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth
Cir., to Associates, Re: Kreisner v. City of San Diego (June 15, 1993) (addressing Kreisner
v. City of San Diego, 988 F.2d 883 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded after reh. denied, 1
F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 1993)); Memo. From Alex Kozinski & Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, J.,
U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to Associates, Response re: Kreisner (June 15, 1993);
Memo. from Betty Binns Fletcher to Associates, Re: Kreisner (June 15, 1993); Memo.
from Robert Boochever, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to Associates, Re: Kreisner
(June 15, 1993); Memo. from Alex Kozinski to Associates, Re: Kreisner (June 15, 1993).
89. Cf Michael Kammen, A Machine that Would Go of Itself The Constitution in
American Culture 18 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1986) (attributing to James Russell Lowell the
statement that "[a]fter our Constitution got fairly into working order it really seemed as if
we had invented a machine that would go of itself').
90. U.S. v. Facchini, 832 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1987), opinion on rehearing, 874 F.2d
638 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane).
91. See Hale v. Norton, 437 F.3d 892 (9th Cir.), withdrawn & superseded, 461 F.3d
1092 (9th Cir. 2006), superseded, 476 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 2007).
92. See e.g. Smith v. Noonan, 992 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1993); Price v. LN.S, 941 F.2d
878 (9th Cir. 1991), withdrawn & superseded, 962 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1992).
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memos but only three were from the coordinator. 9 3 However, the
greater the complexity, the greater likelihood that the en banc
coordinator will play a role because of greater likelihood that
problems will arise, as one could also see in a case with
extensive communication, a panel slow to amend its opinion,
and questions posed about the process.94 And it would be
difficult for the court to proceed smoothly without the
coordinator when faced with two overlapping cases involving
the same issue, a dispute as to the priority of filing, and en banc
calls in both after stop clocks. 95
When multiple cases are being considered for possible en
banc treatment-together or almost simultaneously 96 -the
coordinator's role is likely to become crucial. Matters may also
become quite contentious. In one example, several judges went
at each other hammer and tongs about the underlying issues and
about whether a case should be heard en banc. Included were
exchanges as to a district court's having allowed filing of a
supplemental complaint, interpretations of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, disputes over what sort of issue makes a case
en banc-worthy (about which one judge joined in to chide
another 97), and comments on judicial assignments in the district
court.98
If judges follow the rules for the most part, even when testy
at times about the underlying dispute (as to the merits and en
banc-worthiness), the coordinator's task is not difficult. And
when one judge "calls out" another for action outside the rules,
the judge who erred may well understand the error. Thus, when
93. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988), superseded, 901
F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990).
94. See Duro, 821 F.2d 1358.
95. See Shedelbower, 859 F.2d 727.
96. See e.g. Plazola v. U.S., 487 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1973); U.S. v. Hudson, 479 F.2d
251 (9th Cir. 1972).
97. Memo. from Cecil F. Poole, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to Stephen
Reinhardt, Associates, Re: Keith v. Volpe (Dec. 15, 1988) (addressing Keith v. Volpe, 858
F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988)).
98. Memo. from Cynthia Holcomb Hall J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to
Associates, Re: Keith (Nov. 15, 1988); Memo. from Mary M. Schroeder to Associates, Re:
Keith (Nov. 29, 1988); Memo. from William A. Norris to Associates, Re: Keith (Dec. 1,
1988); Memo. from Stephen Reinhardt to Associates, Re: Keith (Dec. 2, 1988); Memo.
from Cynthia Holcomb Hall to Associates, Re: Keith (Dec. 12, 1988); Memo. from
Stephen Reinhardt to Associates, Re: Keith (Dec. 14, 1988).
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one judge, while disagreeing on substantive grounds, pointed out
that another had called for en banc hearing before panel opinion-
revision, there was an apology for jumping the gun.99 However,
if judges get annoyed with each other and use the rules as a
weapon, matters become more difficult for the coordinator. That
some judges are sticklers about the rules makes this quite likely
to happen, as in a case in which one judge complained about
another's missing a deadline for the panel's response, upon
which the latter complained that the former had not acted in a
timely fashion in raising questions about the panel opinion. This
problem temporarily dissolved when no en banc call was
made, 00 but matters can progress, as when two strong-willed
judges got into a spat about whether one's last-minute stop-
clock had been timely filed, with the panel initially refusing to
give in. After the stop-clock judge said he had acted in good
faith and cited custom and the court's collegiality, the panel
judge removed his objection.' 0 And, in other situations, the
judges themselves may exercise discretion, for example,
waiving a deadline to avoid difficulty 0 2 or working out an
allotment of additional time.1 03
IV. THE COORDINATOR'S FUNCTIONS
While the en banc coordinator's basic function is to
facilitate the court's en banc-related work without taking it over
himself, the coordinator performs a number of more specific
99. See Memo. from Mary M. Schroeder to Associates, Re: Balistreri (Jan. 6, 1990);
Memo. from Stephen S. Trott, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to Associates, Re:
Balistreri (Jan. 17, 1990).
100. See Johnston v. Koppes, 850 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1988).
101. Memo. from Stephen Reinhardt to Alex Kozinski, Alfred T. Goodwin, Associates,
Re: Gutierrez (May 19, 1988); Memo. from Alex Kozinski to Panel, Re: Gutierrez (May
31, 1988) (showing cc to Alfred T. Goodwin); Memo. from Stephen Reinhardt to Panel,
Alfred T. Goodwin, Alex Kozinski, Re: Gutierrez (May 31, 1988); Memo. from Alex
Kozinski to Panel, Alfred T. Goodwin, Re: Gutierrez (June 1, 1988)).
102. See e.g. Memo. from J. Clifford Wallace to All Active Judges, Re: Kanekona v.
City & County of Honolulu (Aug. 17, 1989) (addressing Kanekona v. City & County of
Honolulu, 879 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1989)); Memo. from J. Clifford Wallace to Active &
Senior Judges, Re: Kanekona (Mar. 7, 1990).
103. See e.g. Memo. from Mary M. Schroeder to Alfred T. Goodwin, Panel, Re:
Greenhow v. Dept. of HHS (Sept. 27, 1980) (addressing Greenhow v. Dept. of HHS, 863
F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled, US. v. Hardesty, 977 F.2d 1347 (1992)).
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functions. One is to prod colleagues, for example, when a judge
or panel did not respond to an en banc call. In one case, the prod
was a message saying he assumed that the panel, from which he
had not heard, was willing to have things go forward as they
were, and an amended opinion resulted. 0 4 In another, when,
after memos between two judges, there was no en banc call,
Judge Goodwin sent a memo assuming his function was over;
this led one judge to ask for more discussion, and, after the
judge's suggestions were rejected, there was an en banc call. 0 5
To coordinate judges' en banc activity, the coordinator
must monitor his colleagues' actions. In doing so, the
coordinator might note a slip-up, as when, after learning that an
order (requesting a party's response) had not been received by
the Clerk's Docketing Unit, he asked a judge to re-send the
order.' 0 6 Or he might flag that a PFR had not been timely filed,
which could lead to the panel's asking about allowing a motion
for late filing. 07 The coordinator's monitoring would not be
possible if his colleagues failed to send him copies of relevant
messages or did not write to (or call) him directly with updates
and questions. Of course this sometimes occurs: Panel judges do
not always consult the coordinator but proceed on their own, at
times causing problems that must later be untangled. 0 8
The en banc coordinator regularly inquires of his
colleagues about the status of matters. Thus after one judge had
made a "protective" en banc call and another judge had noted
104. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: LeMaire v. Maass (Sept. 7,
1993) (addressing LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444 (9th Cir. 1993)).
105. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to William A. Norris & Panel, Re: ACT UP! v.
Bagley (Oct. 7, 1992) (addressing ACT UP! v. Bagley, 971 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1992),
withdrawn & superseded, 988 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1993), and including Judge Goodwin's
expression of dissent from denial of rehearing: "I assume that my function as coordinator is
discharged and you are free to negotiate with the panel any way you wish. If you have a
different view, please advise."); Memo. from William A. Norris to Panel, Re: Bagley (Oct.
8, 1992); Memo. from Cynthia Holcomb Hall, Diarmuid O'Scannlain, & Edward Leavy, J.,
U.S., Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to William A. Norris, Re: Bagley (Nov. 20, 1992);
Memo. from William A. Norris to Associates, Re: Bagley (Dec. 11, 1992).
106. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Stephen Reinhardt, Associates, Re: Gutierrez
(July 5, 1988).
107. Memo. from Walter R. Ely, Jr., J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to Panel, Re:
U.S. v. King (Oct. 13, 1978) (addressing U.S. v. King, 587 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1978), and
including a bec to Alfred T. Goodwin).
108. See e.g. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir.), superseded, 847 F.2d 1329
(9th Cir. 1988), opinion withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
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the possibility that the questioned case might settle, Judge
Goodwin asked whether the case would be dismissed and also
asked when a judge would be sending suggested amendments to
the panel; he was later to ask again about the status of the
case.109 He also asked whether a judge's memo "is suggesting
that we defer voting . .. pending a Supreme Court decision ...
or whether she is just flagging the question for consideration by
the en banc court if the case is taken en banc."" 0 Other inquiries
included one when a panel sua sponte proposed en banc hearing,
with Judge Goodwin asking if counsel should be asked whether
the case should be taken en banc or if he should start the time for
responsive memoranda; he shifted from inquiring to nudging
when the panel did not initially respond."' In yet another
situation, when a judge called for en banc hearing, Judge
Goodwin asked if that judge were willing to wait to make the
call because the parties were likely to file a PFREB, to which a
response could then be sought.' 12 And he also asked whether a
senior judge's memo could be incorporated as the memorandum
in support of an en banc call."13
Most of the time the en banc coordinator's inquiries are just
inquiries, but at other times they may be intended to jab or prod
a reluctant or resistant judge into action. Thus in one case, when
a judge did not promptly respond to Judge Goodwin's routine
request that a party be asked to respond to a suggestion for
rehearing en banc, and Judge Goodwin learned from the clerk
109. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Mary M. Schroeder, Panel, Associates, Re:
Love v. Thomas (July 20, 1988) (addressing Love v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir.),
superseded, 858 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1988); Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Panel,
Associates, Re: Love (Sept. 9, 1988).
110. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to All Active Judges, Re: Woratzeck v. Ricketts
(Jan. 30, 1987) (addressing Woratzeck v. Ricketts, 808 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1986),
withdrawn & superseded, 820 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated & remanded, 486 U.S.
1051 (1988)). Woratzeck is reported on remand at 859 F.2d 1559 (9th Cir. 1988).
111. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Panel, All Active Judges, Re: Landreth (Aug.
16, 1987); Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Panel, All Active Judges, Re: Landreth
(Sept. 22, 1987).
112. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to J. Jerome Farris, Associates, Re: Coleman v.
Risley (Feb. 18, 1988) (addressing Coleman v. Risley, 839 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1988),
opinion withdrawn, sub nom. Coleman v. McCormick, 847 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1989)).
113. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to J. Clifford Wallace, Joseph T. Sneed, III,
Herbert Y. C. Choy, Re: Pitrat v. Garlikov (Jan. 6, 1982) (addressing Pitrat v. Garlikov, ,
947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1991) (opinion withdrawn Dec. 21, 1992), superseded, 992 F.2d 224
(9th Cir. 1993)).
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that no such order had been received from the judge, he asked
pointedly, "As author, do you oppose my. . . suggestion that a
response be filed?"ll 4 At that point, the judge did file the order.
While the en banc coordinator makes inquiries, a
significant portion of his work comes from responding to them.
Judge Goodwin's colleagues at times asked about the status of
particular matters when they had not received expected
memoranda, or judges new to the court might seek to learn
whether they were, for example, eligible to vote on en banc
rehearing. More specific was a request about the form of an
order denying en banc rehearing after an en banc failed, because
Judge Kennedy, who had been on the panel, had left for the
Supreme Court." 5 Also specific was coordination of the dates
for supporting memoranda when en banc activity in two related
cases overlapped.1 6 Similarly, a judge who had "jumped the
gun" in calling for en banc before the panel had filed a revised
opinion asked Judge Goodwin, after the revised opinion was
filed, whether he could renew his call.'1 7
In one situation, a judge who was prepared to send a tart
memorandum about an out-of-time stop-clock asked the en banc
coordinator about the wisdom of that action while
simultaneously asking the same question of the panel on which
he sat.118 In a more complex situation, a panel had issued an
amended opinion after an en banc call had been made, and a
judge asked how he should deal with an amended petition for
rehearing. Asking for interpretive guidance, and addressing the
en banc coordinator as "ye All Knowing One," a judge had
found that "[t]wo days after renewing my en banc call, I have
received an 'amended petition for rehearing,"' and noted that he
was "not sure how to proceed." Asking about two possible
114. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Alex Kozinski, Re: U.S. v. Olsowy, (Oct. 8,
1987) (addressing U.S. v. Olsowy, 819 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), superseded, 836 F.2d 439 (9th
Cir. 1987) (amended and republished opinion)).
115. Memo. from David R. Thompson, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to Thomas
Tang, Alfred T. Goodwin, Re: Scott (Feb. 25, 1988).
116. Memo. from Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain to Alfred T. Goodwin, Re: Shedelbower
(Mar. 14, 1990).
117. Memo. from Stephen S. Trott to Associates, Re: Balistreri (Mar. 2, 1990).
118. Memo. from Stephen Reinhardt to Alfred T. Goodwin, Re: Gutierrez (May 16,
1988).
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options, the Audge said, "I seek your guidance in solving these
mysteries."
After Judge Goodwin indicated that "[t]he amended
opinion started a new time line" and suggested what the panel
should do' 20 and the author of the panel opinion had written to
the court about the amended opinion, the judge initially seeking
assistance made another request for guidance. This time he
wished to know whether the new 5.4(b) notice required a
response to the amended rehearing petition, as he thought the
rules required, although he was willing to dispense with the
response and proceed directly to his en banc call.121 Exercising
his discretion, Judge Goodwin cut through matters, noting that
"[n]either the panel nor [the other judge] appear to want another
response," and he immediately set the time for exchange of
memoranda for or against hearing the case en banc.122
One of the en banc coordinator's major functions was to
interpret the court's rules on the en banc process, with rule
interpretation particularly entailing the exercise of discretion.' 23
Many rule interpretations were made in response to inquiries
from judicial colleagues,124 as when Judge Goodwin stated the
rule about senior judges asking for an en banc vote.125 The
interpretive function includes deciphering ambiguous
communications, for example, saying that a judge's memo to the
panel should be treated as a "stop clock"' 26 or that another judge
119. Memo. from Alex Kozinski to Alfred T. Goodwin, Associates, Re: Duro (July 21,
1988).
120. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Alex Kozinski, Associates, Re: Duro (July 22,
1988).
121. Memo. from Alex Kozinski to Alfred T. Goodwin, Associates, Re: Duro (July 26,
1988) ("1 therefore ask for more advice .... .").
122. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Duro (July 29, 1988).
123. For a more complete discussion of the Coordinator's discretion, see section V,
infra.
124. There could even be an explanation of procedure to an attorney, as Judge Goodwin
indicated to the clerk after a misstep occurred with respect to issuance of the mandate in a
case. See Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Dennis R. Mathews, Clerk of the Ct., U.S. Ct.
of App. for the Ninth Cir., Re: Garner v. U.S (Jan. 23, 1973) (addressing Garner v. U.S.,
501 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1972) (en banc), aff'd, 424 U.S. 648 (1976), and suggesting contents
of a letter to an attorney in that case).
125. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Walker v. Loggins (Feb. 15,
1978) (addressing Walker v. Loggins, 608 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1979)).
126. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Law Clerk [not identified by name], Re:
Greenhow (Mar. 7, 1989).
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had misread a stop clock as an en banc call. 127 The coordinator
must often rule on timeliness, as when, in a situation involving
several cases were under scrutiny, Judge Goodwin indicated that
one was available for en banc consideration and another might
be if the panel would recall the mandate.128 And he might also
have to determine who is eligible to vote in a specific case by,
for example, determining who had not entered service in time to
be eligible under the court's rules.1 29
The en banc coordinator was the rules interpreter
particularly when the rules did not seem to cover a particular
situation; there he had to fill in gaps and thus ruled interstitially.
For example, in setting the time for renewal of an en banc call, a
situation for which the rules did not then provide, Judge
Goodwin analogized from the General Orders to set the date for
circulation of an amended oqinion, in order to avoid cutting off a
judge's attempt to respond. Interpretation of the rules might
also entail extending them. For example, Judge Goodwin
applied a proposed Ninth Circuit rule (on not ordering an en
banc court without allowing parties to speak to whether the case
should go en banc) to a situation in which he thought the case a
good one in which to ask for a response to the petition for
rehearing en banc. He said there that "[u]nless there is objection
by one or more judges who wish to get on with the voting," he
would ask the panel to call for a response. In this death penalty
case, he also editorialized: "If the court votes in this case
without hearing from the other side, the voting is more likely to
reflect individual views about the desirability of capital
127. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Panel, Dorothy W. Nelson, Associates, Re:
Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. (Mar. 7, 1989) (addressing Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist., 865
F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1989), superseded, 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated & remanded,
496 U.S. 914 (1990)).
128. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Hudson (May 7, 1973).
129. See e.g. U.S. v. Fernandez-Angulo, 863 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, & remanded, 897 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc); U.S. v. Aguilar, 994
F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1993), superseded, 21 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), ajfd in part,
rev'din part, 515 U.S. 593 (1995). There were a number of recusals in Aguilar because the
defendant, Judge Robert P. Aguilar of the Northern District of California, had contact with
some Ninth Circuit judges. The question of the date of eligibility was debated within the
court and different rules for determining that date were discussed.
130. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Duro (Mar. 28, 1988); Memo.
from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Duro (July 5, 1988).
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punishment than about any of the legal questions lurking in the
case." 31
If the coordinator could use discretion to extend a proposed
rule's reach, he could also refuse to bend the rules. In the same
death penalty case, after en banc voting had started, a judge
suggested that all judges take the time to read the penalty phase
transcript, not yet in all the judges' hands. That prompted Judge
Goodwin to say that "[u]nless overruled by a majority of the
judges, I will not interrupt the voting at this time," and to
comment that "[i]f we interrupt voting after all memos have
been exchanged, we will have to amend the General Orders." 132
The en banc coordinator might advise on specific matters,
as judges acknowledged he had done, and he would suggest
certain actions. Some suggestions came in the form of
reminders. In one instance, in setting the date for circulation of
memoranda, Judge Goodwin reminded his colleagues of the
effect of not doing so in a timely fashion.133 And in reporting a
telephone vote on whether to hear a case en banc, he reminded
them that the results of en banc voting were confidential.134
There were many suggestions on simple procedural matters, as
when he suggested that correspondence carry the date of
decision, to cover the situation when slip opinions had not
circulated and en banc correspondence arrived before the
slips.135 Or the matters might be procedural but somewhat more
complex, as when a judge had sent a "stop-clock" with a memo
but did so during the extension of time that had been granted for
a party to file a PFR; here Judge Goodwin indicated what to do
if a petition for rehearing en banc was or was not filed.136 In
some instances, he might even suggest that additional cases be
131. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to All Active Judges, Re: Woratzeck (Jan. 30,
1987).
132. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to All Active Judges, Re: Woratzeck (June 4,
1987).
133. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Active Judges, Re: U.S. v. Beale (June 17,
1982) (addressing U.S. v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 463 U.S. 1202
(1983); on remand, 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc)).
134. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Active Judges, Re: U.S. v. Sasway (Sept. 16,
1982) (addressing U.S. v. Sasway, 686 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1982)).
135. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: U.S. v. Brock (Apr. 22, 1982)
(addressing U.S. v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982)).
136. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Panel, Alex Kozinski, Associates, Re: U.S. v.
Phelps (July 24, 1989) (addressing U.S. v. Phelps, 877 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1989)).
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considered for en banc hearing, as he did after an en banc call on
137two cases.
Mixing an inquiry with a suggestion, after a call for en banc
hearing, he asked if judges wanted further discussion of the
issue, and suggested that another panel circulate an opinion.
Saying that he was unsure how to phrase the question for an en
banc vote, he indicated possible options before the court, which
included one that there be another opinion in circulation before a
vote.138 And, in another situation, he referred to the "slipstream
of Almeida-Sanchez" to call attention to what his colleagues had
dealt with in the border-search cases and suggested that, in en
banc treatment of a new standard for ineffectiveness of counsel,
the en banc court also deal with the retroactivity of the new rule
that would be developed, in order to avoid the problems with
which the court had suffered earlier.139
The coordinator's suggestions might even bear on the
substance of an en banc ruling, as when-writing as coordinator
and not as a member of the en banc court-Judge Goodwin
proposed a vote on submitting to Chief Judge Chambers several
judges' suggestion about a statement to be placed in an order of
remand to the district court, with Judge Chambers's order then
"dispos[ing] of all the issues in the case except the point to be
reconsidered on remand." (Then, as a member of the court, he
voted yes.)140 At the same time, another judge asked, "[W]ould
it not be better to have our en banc coordinator formulate a
proposition upon which we can vote?" 4 1 After judges agreed to
Judge Goodwin's suggestion, the chief judge circulated his
proposed order of remand, in which members of the court
concurred.
137. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: U.S. v. Jacobs & U.S. v.
Dachsteiner (Mar. 24, 1975) (addressing U.S. v. Jacobs, 513 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974), and
U.S. v. Dachsteiner, 518 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1975)).
138. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Plazola (Mar. 30, 1973).
139. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Cooper (Sept. 9, 1977); see also
Stephen L. Wasby, Court of Appeals Dynamics in the Aftermath of a Supreme Court
Ruling, 42 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. _ (2011) (forthcoming).
140. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Active Judges, John F. Kilkenny, J., U.S. Ct. of
App. for the Ninth Cir., Re: U.S. v. Suarez Del Valle (Feb. 25, 1975) (addressing U.S. v.
Suarez Del Valle, 1974 U.S.App. Lexis 9556 (9th Cir. Mar. 21, 1974)).
141. Memo. from J. Clifford Wallace to Associates, Re: Suarez Del Valle (Feb. 25,
1975).
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At times the coordinator would go further to recommend
action. On hearing from a judge about a concern he shared,
Judge Goodwin wrote to his colleagues about a provision of the
General Orders "which requires that if the panel decides to
amend its disposition it 'shall notify all members of the
court."' 1 42 After explaining the rule's rationale ("to advise
judges who are following the case, but who have not circulated a
memorandum, to know what changes are being made in the
opinion" because such "[c]hanges may affect further
responses"),14 3 he made a specific request:
In the interest of keeping everyone informed and not
moving the target without notice, all judges should ask their
secretaries to make the extra effort to copy all judges when
an amendment is made either in response to a suggestion by
a judge or because the petition for rehearing has called to
the panel's attention a need to correct its opinion."l44
He added, "When in doubt, spread the word. Even redundant
information does no harm, and it may keep the process running
more smoothly."1 4 5
His advice beyond particular cases was often prompted by
what had happened in a specific case. For example, faced with a
party's request for en banc hearing before panel action, about
which the motions attorney had suggested that en banc hearing
was premature, Judge Goodwin recommended to the active
judges that, based on the motions attorney's memorandum, they
deny a motion for en banc hearing. In another instance, he
attempted to avoid confusion by providing advice about filing
"stop clocks" before a panel had issued a G.O. 5.4(b) notice of
its vote on a petition for rehearing. In a talk at the annual
Symposium that the court held for its judges, he further advised
his colleagues, particularly the newest ones, that they should not
seek to stop the clock when an en banc call was "almost
inevitable." 46
142. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Oct. 26, 1987).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Alfred T. Goodwin, Notes (undated) (consisting of preparation for the Ninth
Circuit Symposium held on April 20-23, 1988).
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V. THE COORDINATOR'S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
Formal position descriptions do not always accurately
capture the actual operations of a position's incumbent, and
many instances thus far reported involve the exercise of
discretion or the refusal to exercise that discretion when
insisting on a firm application of the rules, itself also an exercise
of discretion. Discretion was built into the General Orders
provisions about the coordinator. While the set of rules on the
time for actions to be taken did establish parameters within
which the coordinator was to work, making much of his work
"ministerial," discretion was certainly still possible-and was
exercised. For example, seeing that a panel's author was
somewhat behind in revising part of an opinion, Judge Goodwin
used a G.O. provision flexibly so that a twenty-eight-day period
supposed to run from circulation of the parties' response about
whether the case should be heard en banc, instead would be
measured "from [the judge's] . . . notice of intent to amend."l 47
He also proposed that he "stop all en banc proceedings and
[have all judges] send [the judge] all helpful suggestions."l48
The panel dissenter responded to that message with the rejoinder
that, rather than take more time revising the opinion, in turn
requiring a revision of the dissent, "everyone would be better if
this case were either taken en banc immediately or sent on its
way to the Supreme Court where it is likely to end up in any
event."1 49
The exercise of discretion most often involves time-
extending time in which to circulate memoranda and suspending
or holding in abeyance the en banc process. The coordinator also
uses his discretion to un-snarl difficulties and put a partly
derailed process back on track. He might even, for example,
extend matters to slow down en banc activity. When the court
seemed to be getting ahead of itself because there were no cases
before it through which to consider an important issue, Judge
Goodwin asked a panel to recall the mandate in a case and later
147. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Melvin Brunetti, Associates, Re: Duro (Mar.
28, 1988).
148. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Melvin Brunetti, Re: Duro (Apr. 7, 1988)
(including "cc: Associates").
149. Memo. from Joseph T. Sneed, III, to Associates, Re: Duro (Apr. 11, 1988).
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communicated with the panel about initiating the mandate
recall. 150
The coordinator's most frequent exercise of discretion as to
time was to extend the period for circulation of memoranda,
with Judge Goodwin seldom if ever denying a judge's request
that he do so. When a judge was away from chambers (including
out of the county) or sitting on a panel, Judge Goodwin would
allow such requested extensions, and he also allowed them
because of the annual turnover in law clerks.' 5 ' Holidays or the
court's Symposium meeting or the circuit's judicial conference
would lead to blanket extensions. In individual situations, he
extended time so a panel could consider revising its opinion,
doing so even after the panel's author had regularly missed
deadlines for submitting an amended opinion. He deferred
proceedings in another case to allow a panel to circulate a
revised opinion.
The coordinator might put matters in abeyance to help out
individual judges. Judge Goodwin did so when a judge involved
in exchanges about taking a case en banc became ill, even
though it led to a two-month delay in exchange of
memoranda.154 And in a major exercise of discretion, he granted
"a special dispensation"-although only a day was necessary-
requested by a judge who had left the country on the day a
response to the PFR in a case had been filed and was still out of
the country when an off-panel judge had sent his memorandum.
This absence, coupled with the judge's not becoming or being
made aware of the deadline to respond, meant that he had
missed the deadline, leaving the court "with nothing but silence
150. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: U.S. v. Grajeda (Aug. 4, 1978)
(addressing U.S. v. Grajeda, 570 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), withdrawn, 587 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir.
1978)); Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Anthony Kennedy, J. Blaine Anderson, Re:
Grajeda (Oct. 20, 1978).
151. In one instance, he delayed a vote because Judge Sneed was on vacation. Memo.
from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Harmsen v. Smith (Sept. 2, 1976) (addressing
Harmsen v. Smith, 542 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1976)).
152. Memo from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Whitney (Jan. 5, 1988).
153. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Facchini (Apr. 25, 1988).
154. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Kanekona (Dec. 6, 1989);
Memo. from William A. Norris to Associates, Re: Kanekona (Feb. 6, 1990).
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from the author of the opinion."s5 5 As coordinator, Judge
Goodwin also put a case in abeyance to help a judge who was
slow in producing an opinion, putting a stop to proceedings to
allow the judge to rework it, and went so far as to send the judge
suggestions so as to move matters along 56-actions that would
seem to be outside a narrow "coordinating" function. When a
judge's internal court e-mail system crashed, Judge Goodwin
extended the time for the memo necessary to support the judge's
stop clock and then allowed additional time for a panel response
to the stop clock, because the panel was internally circulating a
possible revised opinion and considering whether to respond to
the clock-stopping judge.15 7
At other times, the coordinator suggested deferring the
voting process or holding it in abeyance, sometimes to allow
further exchange of memoranda' 58 but also when the Supreme
Court had just handed down a case relevant to the issue about
which en banc rehearing was being sought;159 this was also done
when en banc rehearing was sought in a case likely to be
affected by a case then in the en banc process.' 60 Judge Goodwin
also delayed a vote because of uncertainty about the procedural
history of an issue, asking the author of the Panel opinion to
send an outline of the matter to other judges' 1 He could also
decide, however, that voting should proceed, as when a party's
PFREB was not received until voting had begun on a sua sponte
en banc call.162 Likewise, when a judge made an out-of-time en
155. Memo. from William C. Canby, Jr., J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to Alfred
T. Goodwin, Associates, Re: U.S. v. X-Citement Video (June 17, 1993) (addressing U.S. v.
X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 513 U.S. 64 (1994)).
156. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Melvin Brunetti, Associates, Re: Duro (Apr. 7,
1988).
157. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to All Active Judges, Re: Duck v. Munn (Sept. 4,
1987) (addressing Duck v. Munn (In re Mankin), 823 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1987)); Memo.
from Alfred T. Goodwin to All Active Judges, Panel, Re: Duck (Sept. 30, 1987).
158. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Giese & U.S. v. McCrea (Dec.
7, 1978) (addressing Giese and US. v. McCrea, 583 F.2d 1083 (1978)).
159. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Scott (Jan. 26, 1988).
160. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Panel, All Active Judges, Re: Jeffers (Jan. 3,
1999).
161. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Watkins (May 19, 1988).
162. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to J. Clifford Wallace, All Active Judges, Re:
Partington v. Gedan (Oct. 17, 1990) (addressing Partington v. Gedan, 880 F.2d 116 (9th
Cir. 1989), vacated, 497 U.S. 1020 (1990), on remand, 914 F.2d 1349 (1990) (per curiam)
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banc call, Judge Goodwin made clear his view that it was not
justified." 3
To avoid problems in one situation, the coordinator
suspended en banc activity until he heard from two panels with
related cases, both of which had post-panel activity. He asked
the panels to coordinate their dispositions of responses to stop
clocks and PFREBs, and wrote to them again to seek further
coordination.164 Judge Goodwin also sometimes exercised
discretion to put matters back on track after a problem had
developed. Thus in one case, a judge had stopped the clock
before the time to do so was supposed to start running-there
had been no G.O. 5.4(b) notice from the panel-so Judge
Goodwin suggested that the panel consider the would-be stop-
clock judge's concerns. 165
In another situation, two cases from different panels were
the subject of an en banc call, but the two cases did not move on
the same track-in one, the opinion with withdrawn and
reassigned-so the en banc coordinator was faced with having
to coordinate the timing. The judge calling for en banc rehearing
abided by the deadlines but proposed a delay, to which there was
agreement. 166 In these cases, a judge raised the problem that a
response to the PFREB had not been requested and he suggested
suspended voting, but the panel's new author instead proposed
(reaffirming and adopting earlier holding), reversed & vacated in part, 923 F.2d 686
(1991) (en banc) (per curiam)).
163. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Midkiff v. Tom (Jan. 21, 1986)
(addressing Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983), rev d, sub nom. Haw. Hous.
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)). The call for en banc hearing in Midkif, Judge
Goodwin noted, "was made after the time had run for calling for a vote and after the parties
had moved to dismiss the [PFR]." As he then stated it, "[i]n the ordinary course the
mandate would have gone down and the case would have been on its way to the Supreme
Court." Thus he found "[a]ny further delay" to be "probably burdensome for the litigants"
and noted that it "does not appear to be justified by any exigent circumstances." Id.
164. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Panels, Re: Shedelbower & Endell v. Smith
(Dec. 9, 1988); see also Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Various Judges, Associates,
Re: Shedelbower & Endell (Jan. 24, 1989); Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates,
Re: Shedelbower & Endell (Mar. 5, 1990); Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Diarmuid
O'Scannlain, Re: Shedelbower & Endell (Mar. 23, 1990).
165. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Garnett (Feb. 22, 1989).
166. Memo. from William A. Norris to Associates, Re: U.S. v. Sanchez (Oct. 13, 1992)
(addressing U.S. v. Sanchez, 967 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1992) & U.S. v. Harrison-Philpot,
978 F.2d 1520 (9th Cir. 1992)); Memo. from J. Clifford Wallace to Panel, Re: Sanchez
(Oct. 20, 1992).
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completing voting.167 Judge Goodwin then, in an example of
handling competing values through the exercise of discretion
informed by a consideration of costs and benefits, agreed with
the calling judge about the rule but agreed with the opinion
author on how to proceed."'
The exercise of discretion might entail skirting the rules.
Thus Judge Goodwin might allow memo exchange to begin
even without a formal 5.4(b) notice of the panel's position on
denying rehearing en banc; 1 likewise, he allowed an untimely
en banc request because the panel order denying rehearing had
not been entered. 170 And in another case, when he had not
received an answer to whether counsel's views should be sought
on having an en banc hearing based on the panel's call, he
pushed a bit, stating the advantages for the other judges of
hearing such views, and he again asked the panel about seeking
counsel's views-something not required by the General Orders
in the situation of a panel's en banc call. 1 With only a stop
clock and no en banc call, he asked the panel to seek a response
from the parties, in order to move things along-another
instance of skirting the rules.172 In a case in which a panel lost a
member upon then-Judge Kennedy's appointment to the
Supreme Court, and another panel member's electing senior
status, Judge Goodwin allowed an en banc call to be made
without panel action.' 73 And in still another instance, in a
situation for which the General Orders had no provision-for an
en banc call by a second judge when the first judge who had
called then withdrew the call-he informed his colleagues that
he was proposing language to allow for a second call in such
situations. He then suggested both that the panel in the
167. Memo. from Alex Kozinski to Alfred T. Goodwin, Re: Harrison-Philpot (Nov. 23,
1992); Memo. from Robert R. Beezer, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to Alfred T.
Goodwin, Re: Harrison-Philpot (Nov. 23, 1992).
168. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Sanchez & Harrison-Philpot
(Nov. 20, 1992) (apparently mis-dated).
169. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Panel, Associates, Re: Watkins (Mar. 29, 1988).
170. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Campbell v. Kincheloe (Apr. 8,
1988) (addressing Campbell v.Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1987)).
171. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Panel, Associates, Re: Landreth (Sept. 22,
1987) (based on a draft by Adell Johnson edited by Judge Goodwin).
172. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Betty Binns Fletcher, Re: Walker v. Endell
(Jan. 20, 1988).
173. No specific citation for this case is available in the Goodwin Papers.
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immediate case wait seven days before filing its denial of
rehearing en banc, should a second judge want to call, and that
another panel in a similar situation also delay until a pending
amendment was adopted. 174
If the en banc coordinator is willing to exercise discretion
to placate his colleagues and to keep the process moving, what
happens when a beneficiary of that discretion nonetheless
continues to pose a problem? In one case, Judge Goodwin had
granted a panel additional time to respond to a stop-clock but it
did not do so within the allotted time. He then told the judge
seeking the stop clock and the panel that if the panel provided no
response by a certain time, an en banc call could be made
without waiting further. That effectively served as a nudge, as
the judge who had stopped the clock and the panel worked out
175matters.
A. Constraints
Is the coordinator's exercise of discretion constrained?
Most definitely. When a panel had added a footnote to an
opinion and the question arose whether this made it a new
opinion, thus triggering certain procedures, we can see Judge
Goodwin limiting the exercise of his authority, as he stated that
he didn't evaluate footnotes for substance. Some constraints
on the coordinator come from his own role conception,'77 but he
is also accountable to the court as a whole. For one thing, he
regularly reports to his colleagues. Reports are made at meetings
like the court's annual Symposium on the actions taken in a
calendar year, such as stop clocks, including those withdrawn
and those proceeding to a vote, and the number of en banc
174. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Fernandez v. Brock (Feb. 25,
1988) (addressing Fernandez v. Brock, 840 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1988), and based on a draft
by Adell Johnson edited by Judge Goodwin).
175. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Mary M. Schroeder, Panel, Re: Greenhow
(Sept. 26, 1988). Slightly earlier, when another judge had not timely responded to a stop
clock, he also let a judge, who wanted to make an en banc call, proceed. Memo. from
Alfred T. Goodwin to Betty Binns Fletcher, Alex Kozinski, Associates, Re: Walker v.
Endell (Dec. 30, 1987).
176. Note from Alfred T. Goodwin on memo. from Jeff [no last name indicated] to
Alfred T. Goodwin, Re: Gutierrez (May 16, 1988).
177. See Section V(A)(1), infra.
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ballots taken, failed, or terminated short of a final vote. In the
shorter run, Judge Goodwin sent messages to his colleagues
about the status of particular cases. He indicated which would
require discussion at the next meeting of Court and Council and
noted activity in some pending cases. 7 8 He also sent them
messages summarizing actions taken when the judges had
discussed a series of cases in which either en banc opinions were
being prepared, a vote on taking a case en bane was scheduled,
or such a vote had occurred.179
Another constraint is that colleagues might dispute or
question his actions. When Judge Goodwin exercised his
discretion quite broadly, his colleagues pushed back. In a partial
en banc that posed the question of how to handle a multi-issue
case in which only one issue raised an en banc matter, Judge
Goodwin had been the author of the panel opinion.' He
seemed to pursue an informal en banc (circulation to all
members of the court, but no formal en banc discussion) to
resolve the question of an. intra-circuit conflict that had been
raised. Quite quickly one judge questioned the proposal, another
chimed in,' 8 ' and even some senior judges objected to this
departure from the process, a clear indication that the en banc
coordinator had exercised his discretion too broadly. (The
regular en bane process was used for the contested issue.)
And there were other times when the coordinator's
colleagues stood up to each other, not easily accepting each
other's authority, and were immovable.1 82 They were not
hesitant to question rule interpretations if they believed that the
coordinator had stretched a rule too far. For example, when
Judge Goodwin treated a belated stop-clock memo as an en banc
call and set time for circulation of memos, this was questioned
as premature with the panel having to consider the stop clock
memo first.' In another case, a judge who said the rule on
178. See Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Dec. 22, 1978).
179. See Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: "Minutes" of January 12,
1979, Meeting (Jan. 15, 1979).
180. See Cook, 608 F.2d 1175.
181. Memo. from J. Clifford Wallace to Associates, Re: Cook (May 8, 1978); Memo.
from Herbert Y. C. Choy to Associates, Re: Cook (May 9,1978).
182. It is often said that one "Article 111" (a lifetime-appointment judge) cannot tell
another "Article III" what to do.
183. Memo. from J. Clifford Wallace to Active Judges, Re: Hoptowit (May 24, 1982).
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calling for the parties' responses should be more flexible pushed
back against Judge Goodwin's request to seek a response, and
Judge Goodwin acceded. While the en banc coordinator may-
indeed, must-at times press for adherence to the rules, rigid
application of them would upset enough colleagues to make it
difficult for the coordinator to function effectively.
Discretion is also constrained by the coordinator's seeking
feedback from, and consulting with, his colleagues. After the
court had set a schedule for circulation of memoranda in one
case, Judge Goodwin consulted with some judges and then
indicated that there would be no vote as originally scheduled,
because the target was not stationary. He also consulted with a
judge who had raised a concern about what the coordinator
would propose,'ss and he had a colleague review some proposed
rule changes before he sent them to Chief Judge Browning. 186
And in one situation, he consulted by asking for a vote so that he
would not be acting unilaterally.
Not only did the en banc coordinator communicate
regularly with his colleagues as individual cases moved through
the process, but, in his role as a problem-solver, he also sent
matters to the court's Executive Committee and thence to the
full court.1ss While the coordinator could play a role, even a
large one, in rule revision, it was the court that could revise the
rules. The coordinator could refer an issue to his colleagues
(who would expect him to present analysis and a
recommendation) or to the circuit's Advisory Committee on
Rules, and he might prepare proposals and supporting
184. Memo. from Betty Binns Fletcher to Alfred T. Goodwin, All Judges, Re: Balistreri
(Mar. 6, 1990).
185. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to J. Clifford Wallace (Oct. 23, 1987) (relating to
having all panel members, when amending dispositions, notify all members of the court);
Memo. from J. Clifford Wallace to Alfred T. Goodwin (Oct. 27, 1987) (same, and stating
that "I think that your memorandum ... will do the job"); Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin
to Associates, (Oct. 28, 1987) (same).
186. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to James R. Browning (May 28, 1987) (noting that
"Judge Schroeder has reviewed the proposed changes and we think they take care of" the
matter).
187. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Khalsa v. Weinberger (Jan. 21,
1986) (addressing Khalsa v. Weinberger, 779 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1985) (as amended
1986)).
188. See Section V(A)(2), infra.
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documentation, with language for amended rules or new rules.
But he could not change the rules unilaterally.
1. Discretion and Role
How the en banc coordinator exercises discretion in
specific instances is one of the best indicators of the
coordinator's perception of that role. How colleagues saw the
coordinator also helped define that role. Some judges showed
him deference or referred to the coordinator as an umpire, with
final authority; in that vein a judge invoked the possibility that
the coordinator exercise "binding arbitration."18  And another
judge sent him a proposed order in another case for his approval
as en banc coordinator.'9 0
Administering rules might be straightforward in most
circumstances, but the existence of discretion to excuse missed
deadlines and to grant extensions raises the question of how
active a role the en banc coordinator should play and how
discretion should be exercised. Judge Goodwin's chief secretary
raised this question when she thought he needed to obtain
direction from the Executive Committee to take a matter to the
full court.19' One of "two approaches to monitoring" by an en
banc coordinator she called the "passive approach" (the judge
later called it the "responsive approach"), in which the
coordinator "would be responsible only for starting the time for
responsive memoranda. . . , sending the ballot, and reporting the
result."' 92 This would rely more on the panel or the judge who
called for en banc to notify others that certain events had
occurred. By contrast, the "aggressive approach" would entail
the coordinator's "monitor[ing] the dates on which responses are
due and start[ing] the memoranda time when the response has
been circulation," in addition to asking panel authors for
189. Memo. from Alex Kozinski to Panel, Re: Gutierrez (May 31, 1988) (including "cc:
Alfred T. Goodwin").
190. Memo. from Ozell M. Trask, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., to Alfred T.
Goodwin, Re: Giese (Mar. 22, 1979).
191. Memo. from Adell Johnson to Alfred T. Goodwin (July 17, 1987). This
memorandum became the basis for a memorandum from Judge Goodwin to the court's
Executive Committee. See n. 195, infra.
192. Johnson Memo, supra n. 191.
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"monthly status reports on any stop clock cases or cases where
en banc procedures have been held pending panel action."l 93
The secretary felt that the former "will result in more en
banc delay and possibly some cases falling through the cracks"
but would take the coordinator "off the hook for any
enforcement of time limits,"l 94 while the judge himself said that
the latter approach would entail "the risk of being seen as
advocating a particular outcome."' 95 One judge, "emphatically
endors[ing]" the aggressive approach "even though it admittedly
adds to your burdens," did not think that its use would make
colleagues see the coordinator as advocating one side over
another. Instead, "[i]t really is just a neutral method to keep the
business of the court flowing properly and expeditiously,"
because the court "as an institution, 'looks bad' when things fall
through the cracks."l96 Three months later, Judge Goodwin, in
nudging a judge to comply with a deadline, said that the court's
judges had "seemed to agree that I should take an assertive
position in enforcing the revised rules orders regarding en banc
proceedings."l 9 7
Related to the coordinator's role conception is that
judge's personal style, with which it is intermeshed. That Judge
Goodwin was of moderate ideology and temperament, with a
dislike of bureaucracy, helps explain his performance as en banc
coordinator. Particularly noteworthy is that, although he could
be tart in private about some judges who routinely delayed
matters, he generally did not complain when writing to
colleagues. One problem about which he quietly signaled his
unhappiness was that judges continued to send memos about
taking a case en banc after the deadline for such memos had
passed, which in at least one instance required re-starting the
voting. He began by saying that, "[i]n the interest of keeping
peace in the family," he was making a suggestion "that all
judges who wish to send late memoranda on en banc matters
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Executive Committee, U.S. Ct. of App. for the
Ninth Cir. (July 27, 1987).
196. Anderson memorandum, supra n. *. It was in this memorandum that Judge
Anderson said that "[w]e, all of us, need a watchdog for the good of the order," which I
have borrowed as title of this paper.
197. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Landreth (Oct. 13, 1987).
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after the time has expired publicly request an extension of time
for that purpose (copies to all judges) before the time has
expired and the ballot has gone out." He also said that
"[c]ompliance with these deadlines will be appreciated." Yet he
ended with the following not-too-veiled message about the
difficulties caused when rule violations blind-sided him:
I am reminded of the death of the great Houdini. He used to
amaze visitors by letting professional pugilists hit him in
the stomach. On the day that his terminal illness began, a
visitor in his dressing room popped him in the stomach
when he was not expecting it. I envy anyone who can, by
an act of will, harden the muscles of his stomach to
withstand a piledriver blow. As en banc coordinator I could
use such strength. 198
2. Problem-Solving.
In addition to dealing with individual cases, the en banc
coordinator is also a problem-solver for the longer term,
although problem-solving activity, including consideration of
rule revision, outside of cases often stemmed from what had
taken place in particular instances. Not simply waiting for a
colleague to identify a problem, the coordinator might spot a
problem in memoranda that came across his desk, or his
secretary or law clerk might call his attention to one. An
example would be that a judge's stop clock or en banc call
didn't "fit" because a PFREB had not been filed or a response
has not been sought or received; having identified the problem,
the coordinator would specify the proper course(s) of action.
Going beyond the immediate issue, Judge Goodwin might
propose rules changes, requiring consideration of the necessity
of new rules and then their form.
Just as constituents' concerns often give rise to policy
questions for legislators, judge-identified policy issues about en
banc practices came to the coordinator as problems for which a
solution was necessary. These might stem from an unclear
provision in the General Orders or from a lacuna in the rules.
Thus a judge questioned the timing of circulating memoranda in
relation to the response to the rehearing petition, complained
198. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Oct. 26, 1987).
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about what he saw as "a dumb rule," and asked the coordinator
for a waiver also saying that "the rules committee should revise
it ASAP."l9 When the same judge complained that an en banc
court had returned its case to the initial three-judge panel, thus
undoing the whole court's decision to take a case en banc, Chief
Judge Browning referred the matter to the court's Executive
Committee,200 and one judge developed the notion of a "Hop To
It" memo to get judges tardy in taking actions to do what they
were supposed to do. 01
Problem-identification might reveal apparent animosity
between judges, as occurred when two disputed an interpretation
of the General Orders, with one saying a stop clock was not
timely.202 However, most problems were pointed out to the en
banc coordinator without rancor-or at least without aiming at
another judge. Thus when confusion as to when responses
should be sought resulted from several requests to file amicus
briefs, Judge Reinhardt said that the situation was "out of hand"
and showed why the court should return to not requiring
responses.203 Another judge, responding to colleagues'
observations in a different case, asked that a staff person prepare
a paper so the issue involved could be discussed.2
Some problems were specific to a particular situation, as
when en banc rehearing was being considered in two related
cases and the question was which case had priority. As both
cases were taken en banc, this also illustrates that in some
problem situations, ultimately nothing needed to be done to
199. Memo. from Alex Kozinski to Alfred T. Goodwin, Associates, Re: U.S. v.
Vasquez-Chan (Mar. 25, 1993) (addressing US v. Vasquez-Chan, 978 F.2d 546 (9th Cir.
1992), overruled, US. v. Nevils, 598 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 2010)).
200. Memo. from James R. Browning to All Active Judges, Re: Zolin, (May 9, 1988).
The Ninth Circuit's decision on remand is reported at 905 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1990). Judge
Browning later found minutes of a 1982 Symposium that were on point. See Memo. from
James R. Browning to Associates (Aug. 9, 1988).
201. Coined by Judge Farris after Hoptowit, 682 F.2d 1237.
202. See Johnston, 850 F.2d 594. The problem evaporated when no en banc call was
made.
203. Memo. from Stephen Reinhardt to Panel, Re: Hocking v. Dubois (June 20, 1988)
(addressing Hocking v. Dubois, 839 F.2d 560 (9th Cir.), withdrawn pending rehearing en
banc, 863 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1988 (mem.), 885 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc)).
204. Memo. from James R. Browning to Cecil F. Poole, Re: Ronwin v. St. B. of Ariz.,
(Nov. 10, 1982) (addressing Ronwin v. St. B. of Ariz., 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd.,
sub nom. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984)).
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205
resolve the specific issue. When a judge requesting both a
stop clock for another unavailable judge and a response had
been misinformed of a missed deadline because of case name
similarities that specific problem was solved by waiving a
deadline.204 An unusual set of problems arose in the aftermath of
the Loma Prieta earthquake, which damaged the circuit's San
Francisco headquarters courthouse and, in the short run, led to
delays in filing of documents.207 When a judge wanted to stop
the clock to protect a party's ability to file a PFREB, Judge
Goodwin said that an order holding deadlines in abeyance would
208take care of the problem.
Some more general problems were relatively minor and did
not require rule changes, as when a judge suggested that
someone stopping the clock or calling for en banc rehearing
should indicate the case's filing date and whether it had been a
published opinion or an unpublished memorandum,209 or when a
party filed only three copies of a response to an en banc
suggestion, leading Judge Goodwin to say that the Orders should
show that "an original and forty copies" should be supplied.2 10
Other problems had broader impact, as when one judge who had
filed a stop clock and wanted assistance from litigant's counsel
as to whether he should make an en banc call claimed another
glitch in the rules after Judge Goodwin had said no response
need be sought from the parties when there was only a stop
205. Memo. from Procter Hug, Jr., to Alfred T. Goodwin, Panels, Re: Shedelbower &
Endell v. Smith (Aug. 31, 1989).
206. Memo. from Stephen Reinhardt, for Dorothy W. Nelson, to Alfred T. Goodwin,
Associates, Re: U.S. v. Martinez (Oct. 18, 1989) (addressing US. v. Martinez, 883 F.2d
750 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated, 929 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991)).
207. See generally Stephen L. Wasby, The Loma Prieta Earthquake and the Ninth
Circuit Court ofAppeals, 11 W. Leg. History 41 (1998).
208. Memo. from William A. Norris to Alfred T. Goodwin, Betty Binns Fletcher, Re:
Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. (Oct. 27, 1987) (addressing
Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 887 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1997),
modified, 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)); Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to
William A. Norris, Re: Planned Parenthood (Oct. 31, 1989).
209. Memo. from J. Blaine Anderson to Associates, Re: Duck (Aug. 18, 1987).
210. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: U.S. v. Wicks (Jan. 26, 1988)
(addressing U.S. v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1987)).
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clock as responses were to be sought only after an en banc
call.2'1
A problem with serious implications arose when a judge
wanted to stop the clock in a death-penalty case after the panel
had ordered a limited remand and had rejected an en banc
suggestion as premature. The judge took the position that he had
been deprived of the opportunity to seek en banc hearing as to
the remand order but then suggested that the panel "unpublish"
the order.212 Here the coordinator weighed in to note the practice
of using unpublished orders for such remands and to say that the
better practice would be to publish the order to avoid the claim
that matters were being swept under the rug; he hoped that the
two sides "could work out their differences . . . without
mobilizing the energy involved in en banc behavior."213 An en
banc call was not avoided, but the calling judge did indicate how
the problem he had raised would ultimately be obviated, if
somewhat awkwardly. 2 14
The presence of "pocket vetoes" illustrates proceeding
from a problem to proposals for change. In several cases, Judge
Goodwin had encountered the situation in which the judges on a
panel, asked by an off-panel judge to reconsider their
disposition, would say that they were "considering revising their
opinion" and then sit on it,215 thus blocking the off-panel judge's
request and resulting in "inordinate delay" because there was no
time limit for panel opinion revision. Noting to the Executive
Committee that "concerns expressed that the General Orders do
not provide a time limit in which a panel, in response to a
211. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Alex Kozinski, Re: Jeffers (Feb. 8, 1988);
Memo. from Alex Kozinski to Alfred T. Goodwin, Re: Jeffers (Feb. 9, 1988).
212. Memo. from Alex Kozinski to Panel, Re: Fetterly v. Paskett (Aug. 4, 1993)
(indicating that Judges Kozinski, Hall, and Wiggins dissented from the order rejecting the
suggestion for rehearing en banc in Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1993), reh.
denied, 15 F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1994), and publishing their dissenting opinion); Memo.
from Alex Kozinski to Stephen S. Trott, Associates, Re: Fetterly (Aug. 5, 1993).
213. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Alex Kozinski, Stephen S. Trott, Associates,
Re: Fetterly (Aug. 6, 1993) (noting that "panels have so far avoided confrontational en
banc traffic by means of unpublished dispositions" and suggesting that, "if it is not possible
to avoid the charge that we are sweeping something under the rug, the better practice is to
publish").
214. Memo. from Alex Kozinski to Alfred T. Goodwin, Re: Fetterly (Sept. 20, 1993).
215. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Executive Committee, U.S. Ct. of App. for the
Ninth Cir. (July 27, 1987).
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request for an en banc vote, must circulate an amended opinion
if the panel has advised that it is reconsidering its decision,"
Judge Goodwin pointed to two specific cases within the
preceding year as "examples of inordinate delay because no time
limit has been set," one in which the panel had considered the
matter for seventeen months and another in which a ballot was
circulated over three months after the en banc call, only after the
coordinator had inquired and the panel "indicated no panel
action."216 (The court adopted the suggestions.)
Revision of rules derived from rulings in a case involved
the possibility of an en banc proceeding before the full twenty-
eight-judge court. An eleven-judge limited en banc panel (LEB)
had not yet completed its work on a case when a judge sought
217full-court en banc review. As en banc coordinator, Judge
Goodwin ruled the call inappropriate. The calling judge took the
matter to a meeting of the court. "After much discussion," in a
situation another judge called "stressful," the court decided not
to put the matter off and "then voted to overrule Judge
Goodwin's ruling," thus allowing the call if the judge wished to
proceed.2 18 This resulted only after an exchange of long memos
between Judge Kozinski, who had made the call for the full
court en banc, and Judge Schroeder. Recognizing the need for
revision of the rules in such situations, the court both made clear
that it had "voted with the understanding that the action was sui
generis to the instant case and would not indicate general policy
towards allow[ing] a call for full en banc" and instructed the En
Banc Committee, of which Judge Goodwin was a member, to
propose changes to the relevant General Order.219
Judge Goodwin shortly initiated communication with
committee members, sending a rough draft of a proposal to
revise two provisions of the General Orders. One was on
withdrawal of three-judge panel opinions when a case was taken
en banc, and the other concerned the matter on which he had
216. Id.
217. The case was Arguelles-Vasquez v. INS., 786 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated,
844 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988).
218. Later, the judge who had spoken of the "stressful court meeting" said that "we
reached a compromise through the good efforts and willingness of many to reach some
accommodation with respect to that case." Memo. from Mary M. Schroeder to Associates,
Re: Arguelles-Vasquez (Mar. 30, 1988).
219. U.S. Ct. of App. for the Ninth Cir., Minutes: Meeting of Oct. 5, 1987.
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been overruled, as to which he noted that while the court had not
taken a case away from a panel prior to the panel's filing its
disposition, some provision for doing so in unusual
circumstances might be needed.220 After hearing from his fellow
committee members, 22 1 he suggested specific language, noting
that he and Judge Sneed favored one version of the rule on
removing a case from an en banc panel while Judge Reinhardt
favored another.222 At the same time, he made a suggestion on a
related matter, of en banc hearing on emergency motions, as
there "is now no provision for a vote to go en banc and overrule
the granting of [a] stay"-although there could be one if a stay
223were denied.
Changes in one set of rules might also reveal the need for
yet other changes. Soon after rules changes, the coordinator
might face colleagues' statements, even complaints, about
difficulties. For example, after one panel had sought initial en
banc, Judge Goodwin inquired of the panel about seeking the
parties' views on taking the case en banc. The panel's presiding
judge complied but groused, asking if additional briefs were not
overkill. Citing the rule on which he based his request and the
rule's rationale, Judge Goodwin offered an explanation for his
action. He said that the new rules were in a shakedown period,
so the court should discuss judges' views on asking for briefs in
that situation, and he went on to indicate that he would also be
asking his colleagues to approve a rule requiring a anel to
circulate an opinion before asking for hearing en banc.22
In one instance of a new circuit rule leading to the
consideration of changes to the court's General Orders, Judge
Goodwin, after consulting with another judge, sent proposals to
the chief judge to be considered by the court's Executive
220. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Joseph T. Sneed, III, Stephen Reinhardt (Oct.
28, 1987).
221. Memo. from Joseph T. Sneed, III, to Alfred T. Goodwin, Stephen Reinhardt (Oct.
29, 1987); Memo. from Stephen Reinhardt to Alfred T. Goodwin, Joseph T. Sneed, III Oct.
30, 1987).
222. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Joseph T. Sneed, III, Stephen Reinhardt (Nov.
3, 1987).
223. Id.
224. Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates, Re: Landreth (Oct. 13, 1987).
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Committee.225 That fixing one problem could lead to another
also became apparent when the court set the amount of time in
which parties were asked to file responses on whether to take a
case en banc. The result of the interlocking rules was that a
judge seeking en banc rehearing had to circulate a supporting
memo before the parties' responses were received. Calling this
difficulty to his colleagues' attention, Judge Goodwin suggested
re-sequencing matters.
VII. EPILOGUE: AFTER JUDGE GOODWIN
Judge Goodwin was to continue as en banc coordinator
until 1993, some time after he had stepped down as chief judge.
After Judge J. Clifford Wallace had begun to acclimate to being
chief judge, Judge Goodwin was finally able to relinquish the en
banc coordinator position to Judge Mary M. Schroeder. When
Judge Schroeder succeeded Judge Procter Hug, Jr., as chief
judge, Judge Sidney R. Thomas became the coordinator, and he
has continued to serve under Chief Judge Alex Kozinski. While
the court has retained the en banc coordinator position, it created
a separate structure for en banc activity in death penalty cases,
with another judge, David R. Thompson, initially designated to
227coordinate that process. After Judge Thompson gave up the
position, Judge Thomas served for a while as coordinator of
both the regular and death penalty en banc processes. After
Judge Michael Daly Hawkins's brief tenure as death penalty en
banc coordinator, Judge Thomas again added the death penalty
en banc coordinator duties to those of the en banc coordinator.
The separate position of death-penalty coordinator was
created because of the need for extremely prompt action in
capital cases, particularly as to stays of execution, although
having separate processes is in part "a matter of administrative
225. See Memo. from Alfred T. Goodwin to James R. Browning (May 28, 1987)
(sending proposals for three changes to General Orders).
226. Alfred T. Goodwin, Report as En Banc Coordinator, U.S. Court ofAppeals for the
Ninth Circuit (prepared for Ninth Circuit Symposium in Blaine, Wash., Apr. 20-23, 1988).
227. Judge Goodwin had handled some death-penalty cases, which did not necessarily
entail more work for the coordinator than non-capital cases, but the cases were not ones
arriving at the court on last-minute stay requests.
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convenience." 228 The death penalty en banc process is shorter
than that for other cases. While the vote on taking non-capital
cases en banc extends over two weeks, the comparable period
for death penalty cases is extremely short. Moreover, whereas a
judge's not voting in the regular en banc process is the
equivalent of a "no" vote because a majority of all non-recused
active judges must vote "yes" for a case to be taken en banc, a
judge's not voting in the death penalty en banc situation is
considered a "yes" vote.
Otherwise, except for "some fine-tuning of administrative
procedure," the processes for handling activity related to en banc
rehearing have "remain[ed] by and the large same." 229 The
processes, having become regularized during Judge Goodwin's
long tenure in the position, are now institutionalized, and thus
are not dependent on a single judge. And it appears to be the
case that the en banc coordinator will be either the judge next in
line to be chief judge ("the crown prince[ss]") or the judge next
on the seniority list.
One noticeable change from the "Goodwin regime" was
moving the responsibility for most coordination work from the
coordinator's chambers to the hands of Paul Keller in the
Clerk's Office. Keller, who had briefly served as a clerk to Chief
Judge Goodwin on loan from the Staff Attorney's Office and
had later returned to the court as a staff attorney, in 2000 was
asked to be the Clerk's Office "point person" for en banc
matters. Keller was asked to take on these duties because of his
prior work on en bancs for Chief Judge Goodwin and his
unlimited-tenure position with the court. As he put it, "I had
institutional knowledge and would be around for a while." He
thus provides continuity, which is important because, especially
with law clerks changing each year, "judicial assistants, law
clerks, and even judges have questions about procedural steps
with pending petitions for rehearing en banc," questions Keller
generally answers "where the court Rules and the General
Orders are clear." He also maintains an internal website
indicating the procedures and steps in each case.230 One might
228. Telephone interview with Paul T. Keller, Supervisory Staff Atty., U.S. Ct. of App.
for the Ninth Cir. (Oct. 8, 2009) [hereinafter "Keller Interview"].
229. Id.
230. Id.
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speculate that the institutional support that Keller provides
would make it easier to persuade a judge to become en banc
coordinator, contrary to the situation when there were no
"takers" when Judge Goodwin sought to relinquish the position
on becoming chief judge.
Keller's work includes informing judges of deadlines and
circulating ballots, memoranda about which now are sent over
Keller's signature rather than Judge Thomas's. However, any
key or important decisions have been and are made by the en
banc coordinator, not Keller. Although Keller provides staff
assistance to Judge Thomas who "may ask what I think," Keller
refers matters to Judge Thomas "when the issue is not resolved
by circuit court Rules or the General Orders" and is "anything
involving discretion," such as waiving or extending deadlines
when a judge seeks additional time to submit a request or
circulate a memo-in short, any "grey area." 23 1 Judge Thomas
himself "settles questions over filing deadlines, and the
timeliness of en banc calls."232
In view of Chief Judge Chambers's initial rationale for the
en banc coordinator position-that a judge, not someone in the
Clerk's Office, should remind judges of deadlines-it is
interesting that Keller feels he has "not encountered any
resistance" from judges, but that is because he is "only dealing
,233with unambiguous matters." His work generally extends "only
to the point where en banc fails or goes." However, Chief Judge
Kozinski appears to rely more on Keller for the drafting of
orders and memos than did Judge Schroeder, and so, under the
present chief judge, Keller has also drafted memos about
deadlines within the en banc court. The result is an arrangement
that seems to have some parallels to Judge Goodwin's greater
role under Chief Judge Chambers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The en banc activity of a federal court of appeals-not only
the activity that takes place after en banc hearing is granted, but
231. Id.
232. Dan Levine, Potential High Court Nominee Thomas Would Fit Obama Narrative,
Recorder (May 5, 2010).
233. Keller Interview, supra n. 228.
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the activity while a court decides whether to hear a case en
banc-is quite important, both in resolving inconsistencies
within circuit jurisprudence and in engaging more members of
the court than participate in the three-judge panels that decide
most of the court's cases. When the communication relating to
taking a case en banc becomes voluminous, it may be necessary
to have someone superintend the process, reminding judges of
deadlines and enforcing the court's rules. Only one federal
circuit, the Ninth, has decided to have a judge fill a position
denominated en banc coordinator. In this article, the work of the
en banc coordinator is demonstrated through the actions of
Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, who held the position for roughly
twenty years.
An en banc coordinator does not act alone, but has
assistance from secretaries and law clerks, and other judges
cooperate in moving cases through the en banc process or in
raising questions about problems and then helping resolve them.
The en banc coordinator can be seen to inquire of his colleagues
and to respond to their inquiries, interpret the rules, suggest
actions to fellow judges, and advise them how to proceed, and
also to recommend courses of action. The en banc coordinator
often exercises discretion, although there are also constraints on
that discretion. At least the en banc coordinator draws from the
particulars of specific cases to take a larger view of the court's
en banc rules, which he assists in refining.
We do not know the effect of the Ninth Circuit's position
of en banc coordinator on other courts of appeals, but we have
not seen any diffusion of this innovation in judicial
administration. Certainly a number of the other courts of appeals
have attained the number of judges that the Ninth Circuit had
when Chief Judge Chambers asked Judge Goodwin to assume
the new position and thus have the same need for coordination
of post-panel communication about cases.234 However, perhaps
the pre-filing circulation of published opinions used by some
234. For example, the Fourth Circuit has had fifteen authorized judgeships since 1990
and the Fifth Circuit has had seventeen. See Federal Judicial Center, History of the Federal
Judiciary: The U.S. Courts of Appeals and the Federal Judiciary, http://www.fjc.gov/
history/home.nsf/page/courts-of appeals.html (click "Select a Circuit" from the menu on
the left margin to reach individual-circuit information) (accessed May 18, 2011; copy on
file with Journal of Appellate Practice & Process).
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other circuits and their "informal en banc processes" 235 lessen
the need for such a position, and it may be possible that the
Ninth Circuit's interest in institutional innovations made it more
likely to establish such a position and to continue to be the only
court to have done so. 236
235. See e.g. Michael S. Kanne, The 'Non-Banc En Banc': Seventh Circuit Rule 40(e)
and the Law of the Circuit, 32 S. Ill. L. J. 611 (2007); see generally Ginsburg & Falk,
supra n. 3, at 1015-16 (1991).
236. See Restructuring Justice: The Innovations of the Ninth Circuit and the Future of
the Federal Courts (Arthur D. Hellman ed., Cornell U. Press 1990).
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